




Jeremy D. Rozansky† 
By according agencies the power to interpret the law, Chevron deference in-
creases the power of administrative agencies. Yet agencies may not always want the 
benefits of Chevron deference. If the agency is a party in a lawsuit, it might decide 
not to seek Chevron deference in the hope that the court will reverse its binding policy. 
Following the inauguration of President Donald Trump, the Federal Communications 
Commission did just that in Global Tel*Link Inc v FCC, a lawsuit concerning regula-
tions of calling services at correctional facilities. At least initially, the DC Circuit did 
not apply the Chevron framework because the agency did not seek it. This Comment 
looks at the novel issue raised by Global Tel*Link—namely, Chevron waiver, the 
idea that an agency’s decision not to seek deference can prevent the application of 
the Chevron framework. 
Chevron waiver can appear in many forms: a failure to raise or a disclaimer 
of a right to deference could waive Chevron. Sometimes the agency itself waives, and 
sometimes another official has litigating authority. Different agencies may have lit-
igating authority, and a failure to make arguments at any of the Chevron frame-
work’s steps could amount to Chevron waiver. Moreover, there are many possible 
motivations for the policy reversal, from new technical conclusions, to interest group 
lobbying, to intra-administration conflicts, to the post–presidential transition rever-
sal in Global Tel*Link. 
As a possible new threshold inquiry before the Chevron framework is applied, 
Chevron waiver would inhere at Chevron Step Zero. But the doctrinal formulations 
of Step Zero neither prescribe, imply, nor prohibit the possibility of Chevron waiver. 
Instead, this Comment looks to a series of rationales that the Supreme Court, when 
justifying Chevron deference or giving shape to Step Zero, has ascribed to a hypo-
thetical reasonable Congress. Though the rationales made explicit in the Step Zero 
cases—expertise and agency accountability—do not strongly suggest a resolution to 
the question of Chevron waiver, a third rationale does. The reasonable Congress 
wants agency policy change to be channeled through rigorous procedures. Such pro-
cedures—like notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication—help en-
sure that the agency actually wrestles with technical arguments, more fully deliber-
ates, alerts Congress and interested individuals to a pending action, works with 
elected officials, and provides a basic opportunity for individual participation in the 
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decision-making. Because Chevron waiver is a means of circumventing these rigor-
ous procedures, this Comment urges courts to apply the Chevron framework when 
it is warranted despite the fact that an agency does not seek it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc v Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc1 has been a boon for federal agen-
cies. The decision created “Chevron deference,” which gives agen-
cies considerable leeway to interpret statutes. Under Chevron’s 
two-step formula, courts will defer to an agency interpretation if 
(Step One) the statute is ambiguous and (Step Two) the interpre-
tation is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”2 So 
long as the agency selects a meaning that could reasonably be 
taken from (frequently opaque) statutory language, the agency’s 
interpretation will stand. In effect, Chevron adds the interpretive 
power—the power “to say what the law is”—to the litany of other 
agency powers.3 
Yet from time to time, agencies may want to shed their inter-
pretive power and not seek Chevron deference, a move I call 
“Chevron waiver.” This can be done by stipulating to the court 
 
 1 467 US 837 (1984). 
 2 Id at 843. 
 3 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va L Rev 187, 188–89 (2006). Professor 
Cass Sunstein calls Chevron a “counter-Marbury for the administrative state.” Id at 189. 
See Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
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that the agency no longer wishes to defend its interpretation or 
does not claim Chevron deference. An agency may choose to waive 
Chevron for any number of reasons. Perhaps new information has 
come to light. Maybe the agency is under pressure from an en-
gaged and intense lobby. Or maybe, after a presidential transi-
tion, new agency leadership wants to reverse the previous admin-
istration’s policy. The latter occurred in 2017. Global Tel*Link v 
Federal Communications Commission4 concerned caps on the 
rates charged by prison inmate–calling services imposed by the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) during the Obama 
administration. In the wake of President Donald Trump’s inau-
guration, the FCC declined to defend its interpretation and seek 
Chevron deference. A panel of the DC Circuit respected the 
agency’s position and did not apply the familiar two-step frame-
work despite the presence of an intervenor arguing for deference.5 
Six weeks later, however, the panel had second thoughts and 
amended its opinion. The revised opinion held that the Obama 
FCC’s interpretation was unreasonable all along and would 
therefore fail Chevron’s second step, so the court did not need to 
reach the issue of what to do when the agency does not seek Chevron 
deference.6 
This case illustrates that not all Chevron questions have been 
answered. In particular, judges have not grappled with Chevron 
waiver—a question that goes to the heart of why Chevron defer-
ence exists. Each of the three judges on the panel wrote sepa-
rately about Chevron waiver, but not one cited an authority. In-
stead, the judges resorted to conclusory statements that Chevron 
deference “would make no sense”7 or “would be inappropriate” 
when the agency does not seek deference.8 The panel retreated to 
intuition rather than relying on authority because, in fact, there 
was no authority to cite. 
If permitted, there is good reason to think that agencies will 
make periodic use of Chevron waiver, especially in an age in 
which administrative powers are increasingly used as partisan 
weapons.9 But should agencies be allowed to waive Chevron? This 
 
 4 866 F3d 397 (DC Cir 2017). 
 5 Id at 402, 407–08. 
 6 Id at 417. 
 7 Id at 408. 
 8 Global Tel*Link, 866 F3d at 418 (Silberman concurring). 
 9 See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy 
Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 Duke L J 1671 (2012). 
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Comment explores the law behind the DC Circuit’s intuitions and 
rejects the court’s initial conclusion that waiver should be allowed. 
This Comment proceeds as follows. Part I describes the 
unique circumstances of Global Tel*Link and generalizes to de-
scribe how an agency can waive Chevron and the set of circum-
stances that could lead to Chevron waiver. Chevron waiver would 
act as another element of Chevron’s Step Zero, the inquiry into 
whether the Chevron framework should be applied. This Comment 
therefore evaluates Chevron waiver as a Step Zero question. 
Part II looks to the case law formulating Chevron Step Zero, but 
the standard doctrinal formulations for Step Zero address only 
when an agency is entitled to deference and shed little light on 
whether that deference is mandatory. Hence, Part III examines 
the Chevron waiver question not from Step Zero’s doctrinal for-
mulations but from the principles working beneath the surface of 
the Step Zero cases. Specifically, the Supreme Court’s Step Zero 
cases consider why a hypothetical reasonable Congress intended 
its statute’s ambiguities to be resolved by the agency. The reasons 
for Chevron deference—agency expertise, accountability, and rigor-
ous agency procedures—all help determine when Chevron applies. 
As Part III discusses, the particular risk of Chevron waiver is that 
it allows the agency to circumvent the rigorous and accountability-
enhancing, policy-formulating procedures set up by Congress. 
Given that overriding concern, this Comment urges a prohibition 
on Chevron waiver. 
I.  THE ANATOMY OF CHEVRON WAIVER 
The Chevron doctrine increases the power of agencies.10 Un-
der Chevron, courts defer to the agency that administers the stat-
ute. The obvious question is why an agency would ever want a 
reviewing court to give greater scrutiny to its interpretations, less-
ening its power. This Part argues that there are common scenar-
ios in which an agency can be expected to want to waive Chevron 
and that, if courts recognize the power to waive Chevron, agencies 
will add Chevron waiver to their policymaking toolkit. First, this 
Part describes Global Tel*Link, in which the issue of Chevron 
waiver came before the DC Circuit as a matter of first impression. 
 
 10 See Kent Barnett and Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 
Mich L Rev 1, 30–31 (2017) (observing that agencies won 77 percent of the circuit court 
cases in which the panel applied Chevron deference but less than 54 percent of the cases 
in which it did not). 
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Part I.B then discusses how an agency can go about waiving 
Chevron. Finally, Part I.C describes the common conditions under 
which an agency will want to waive Chevron and why, if Chevron 
waiver is permitted, it could become a feature of administrative 
practice. 
A. Global Tel*Link: Chevron Waiver in a Case of First 
Impression 
Section 276 of the Communications Act11 empowers the FCC 
to “promote the widespread deployment of payphone services to 
the benefit of the general public.”12 The statutory definition of 
payphone services includes what the industry terms “inmate tel-
ephone service[s]” offered in correctional institutions.13 The Act 
directs the FCC to “take all actions necessary . . . to prescribe reg-
ulations that establish a per call compensation plan to ensure 
that all payphone service providers are fairly compensated for 
each and every completed . . . interstate call.”14 Rates for inmate 
calling services were historically left unregulated by the FCC.15 
Inmates face significantly higher calling rates than they 
would at a public payphone. Before the first federal rate caps were 
introduced, inmates in some states paid as much as $17.30 for a 
fifteen-minute long-distance collect call.16 One reason rates are so 
high is that service providers compete for contracts at correctional 
facilities, often by bidding up site commissions, the shares of rev-
enue that go to the correctional facility.17 Rates are also higher 
inside prisons and jails because of security concerns. Texas, for 
instance, requires providers to integrate voice biometric screen-
ing.18 Of course, higher calling rates limit an inmate’s ability to 
contact family members and attorneys.19 
 
 11 Relevant sections added in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-
104, 110 Stat 56, codified in various sections of Title 47. 
 12 47 USC § 276(b)(1). 
 13 47 USC § 276(d). 
 14 47 USC § 276(b)(1). 
 15 See Report and Order, In the Matter of Policies and Rules Concerning Operator 
Service Providers, 6 FCC Rec 2744, 2752 (1991). 
 16 Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In the Matter of 
Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, 28 FCC Rec 14107, 14126 (2013) (“2013 ICS 
Order”). 
 17 Id at 14129. 
 18 See Joint Brief for ICS Carrier Petitioners, Global Tel*Link v Federal Communications 
Commission, No 15-1461, *5 (DC Cir filed Nov 14, 2016) (“Providers’ Brief”). 
 19 See 2013 ICS Order at 14130 (cited in note 16). 
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After lobbying from the families of inmates, the FCC decided 
to regulate inmate calling services. Following a 2012 notice of pro-
posed rulemaking and comments from interested parties, the 
FCC adopted interim rate caps for inmates’ interstate calls in 
2013.20 Several parties, including inmate calling–service provid-
ers, challenged the 2013 order in the DC Circuit, which granted a 
partial stay of the regulation and subsequently held the case in 
abeyance as the FCC began a second round of rulemaking on in-
mate calling services.21 
The new order—promulgated in 2015 after traditional notice-
and-comment rulemaking and challenged in Global Tel*Link—
adopted tiered rate caps, with more stringent caps reflecting the 
lower cost associated with providing service at larger correctional 
facilities.22 The rate caps were formulated without factoring in the 
cost of site commissions, in the hope that the regulation would 
trigger change-of-law clauses in inmate calling–service contracts; 
renegotiations between providers and facilities; and a new, site 
commission–free market norm.23 Most dramatically, the FCC 
claimed authority over intrastate inmate calls, applying the rate 
caps to intrastate calls.24 The regulation was promulgated with 
all three Democratic appointees voting in favor and the two  
Republican-appointed commissioners dissenting. Then- 
Commissioner Ajit Pai challenged the majority’s reading of the 
organic statute’s requirement that providers be “fairly compen-
sated.”25 The language comes from the Telecommunications Act of 
1996,26 which was Congress’s response to the monopoly that dom-
inated the telecom industry. Pai reasoned that, given this context, 
Congress was concerned with service rates that, because of subsi-
 
 20 See id at 14147. 
 21 See Order, Securus Technologies, Inc v Federal Communications Commission, No 13-
1280 (DC Cir filed Jan 13, 2014); Order, Securus Technologies, Inc v Federal Communications 
Commission, No 13-1280 (DC Cir filed Dec 6, 2014). 
 22 Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, 80 Fed Reg 79136, 79137 (2015) 
(“2015 Order”). 
 23 See id at 79154 (“[W]e conclude that our actions in this Order constitute changes 
in law and/or instances of force majeure that are likely to alter or trigger the renegotiation 
of many ICS contracts.”). 
 24 Id at 79139. 
 25 Second Report and Order and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In 
the Matter of Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, 30 FCC Rec 12763, 12961–65 
(2015). 
 26 Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56, codified as amended in various sections of Title 47. 
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dies or discriminatory conduct, were “too low to ensure fair com-
pensation,” not too high.27 In addition, Pai explained the source of 
the FCC’s plenary rate-setting authority was not the specific pay-
phone provision in § 276 but rather § 201 of the Communications 
Act, which limited the authority to interstate and international 
service.28 
Global Tel*Link originated in several providers’ petitions for 
judicial review of the 2015 order. The providers challenged the 
2015 order on a number of grounds, including that the rate caps 
were arbitrary and capricious and that the FCC had exceeded its 
statutory authority.29 
Presidential politics transformed a run-of-the-mill case about 
agency authority and allegedly heavy-handed regulations into a 
case about whether an agency could waive its considerable discre-
tion under Chevron. Global Tel*Link was fully briefed in November 
2016, just days after Donald Trump was elected president.30 The 
FCC’s five-member board is appointed by the president, with, cus-
tomarily, three members representing the president’s party and 
two representing the other party.31 The vote on inmate calling–
service rate caps followed party lines, so a shift in the partisan 
makeup of the FCC signaled a likely shift in the Commission’s 
position on the rate caps. 
Argument was scheduled for February 6, 2017. Anticipating 
a shift in the Commission’s position, on January 11, 2017, the DC 
Circuit asked the parties to “show cause” for not holding the case 
in abeyance as the Commission turned over.32 Commissioner Jessica 
 
 27 In the Matter of Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, 30 FCC Rec at 12961–62. 
 28 Id at 12960. 
 29 See Providers’ Brief at *17–18 (cited in note 18). 
 30 The final reply brief was filed on November 14, 2016, six days after the presiden-
tial election. See generally Joint Reply Brief for the ICS Carrier Petitioners, Global 
Tel*Link v Federal Communications Commission, No 15-1461 (DC Cir filed Nov 14, 2016). 
 31 The statute prevents the president from appointing more than three commission-
ers from his own party. See 47 USC § 154(b)(5). Customarily, the chairman resigns at the 
beginning of each new administration, allowing the president to appoint a member of his 
own party as chairman and giving the president’s party a majority. See Margaret Harding 
McGill and Alex Byers, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler to Resign (Politico, Dec 15, 2016), 
archived at http://perma.cc/B5VW-JF2X. 
 32 See Order, Global Tel*Link v Federal Communications Commission, No 15-1461, 
*1 (DC Cir filed Jan 11, 2017). 
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Rosenworcel’s term expired on January 3 (she has since been re-
nominated and confirmed33), and Chairman Tom Wheeler, follow-
ing custom, was to resign effective January 20.34 By January 21, 
the two dissenters from the 2015 order would constitute a major-
ity of the three active commissioners. Yet the DC Circuit panel 
determined that arguments should go ahead as scheduled.35 The 
Obama administration argued that relief for inmate families had 
been delayed long enough.36 The administration was probably 
also keen to keep the case before the assembled panel, which in-
cluded two Democratic appointees and only one Republican, 
Judge Laurence Silberman. Silberman dissented from the court’s 
decision to hold arguments as scheduled, preferring to give the FCC 
a sixty-day window to determine whether it would revisit the 
2015 order.37 He also noted that, eight years earlier, a similar lux-
ury had been afforded to the incoming Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), giving the Obama administration time to deter-
mine if it wanted to rescind a Bush-era rule.38 
Three days after Inauguration Day, Pai was designated FCC 
Chairman. The majority of the Commission now held the position 
that the FCC did not possess statutory authority to promulgate 
intrastate rate caps for inmates.39 The majority soon directed the 
FCC’s counsel to abandon the argument contained in the first sec-
tion of its brief: that the FCC had authority to cap intrastate 
rates.40 In addition, the FCC abandoned the argument that it law-
fully considered industry-wide average costs when it set the rate 
caps, a practice the industry lawyers had argued was contrary to 
 
 33 See Jessica Rosenworcel: Commissioner (Federal Communications Commission), 
archived at http://perma.cc/NJH7-8GMK. 
 34 See Letter, Global Tel*Link v Federal Communications Commission, No 15-1461, 
*1 (DC Cir filed Jan 31, 2017) (“Jan 31 Letter”). 
 35 Order, Global Tel*Link v Federal Communications Commission, No 15-1461, *1 
(DC Cir filed Jan 18, 2017) (“Jan 18 Order”). 
 36 Response of the Respondents to Show Cause Why These Cases Should Not Be 
Placed in Abeyance, Global Tel*Link v Federal Communications Commission, No 15-1461, 
*3 (DC Cir filed Jan 17, 2017). As so often happens, the two sides switched positions on 
procedural issues as the political upper hand shifted. The government had successfully 
argued for an abeyance of the litigation over the 2013 ICS order as the FCC considered 
comments that eventually led to the 2015 order. See Joint Response of Petitioners Global 
Tel*Link Corp. and Centurylink Public Communications, Inc. to Order to Show Cause, 
Global Tel*Link v Federal Communications Commission, No 15-1461, *2–3 (DC Cir filed 
Jan 17, 2017). 
 37 Jan 18 Order at *2 (cited in note 35) (Silberman dissenting). 
 38 Id, citing California v Environmental Protection Agency, No 08-1178 (DC Cir, Feb 
25, 2009). 
 39 Jan 31 Letter at *1 (cited in note 34). 
 40 Id. 
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the statute.41 Because of the change in its argument, the FCC 
ceded ten minutes of its time to intervenors representing families 
of inmates.42 The intervenors were permitted to argue for the 2015 
order in its entirety.43 
Each retracted section of the brief concerned the agency’s in-
terpretation of the text of the Communications Act. The section 
concerning intrastate rates explicitly cited Chevron, while the 
section concerning average costs cited a case that applied Chevron 
to support deference to the agency’s line drawing.44 The interve-
nors’ brief largely left these Chevron arguments to the agency. 
Their oral advocate began his argument by pointing to a footnote 
in the intervenors’ brief that he said incorporated the Chevron 
arguments.45 His brief only touched on Chevron, the advocate 
said, because the FCC had briefed the issue and he was following 
instructions “not to file repetitive briefs.”46 None of the judges im-
mediately pushed back against the intervenors’ claim that its 
briefing of the Chevron issue was “more than adequate.”47 Later 
in the appearance, Silberman pressed the intervenors’ advocate 
about whether Chevron arguments had been abandoned, and the 
advocate insisted that the agency had to promulgate its new pol-
icy through the usual means.48 
Judge Harry T. Edwards, writing for the majority, interpreted 
the agency’s abandonment of the statutory interpretation argu-
ments as waiving Chevron deference altogether. Though agency 
promulgations carrying the force of law are “presumptively” sub-
ject to Chevron review, the presumption was overcome by the 
agency’s decision to abandon its interpretation.49 It would simply 
“make no sense” to apply Chevron to a position the agency has 
 
 41 Id at *1–2. See Brief for Respondents, Global Tel*Link v Federal Communications 
Commission, No 15-1461, *48 (DC Cir filed Nov 10, 2016) (“FCC Brief”). 
 42 Jan 31 Letter at *2 (cited in note 34). 
 43 Id. 
 44 FCC Brief at *32, 39, 49 (cited in note 41). 
 45 Oral Argument, Global Tel*Link v Federal Communications Commission, No 15-
1461, 1:00:56–1:01:51 (DC Cir Feb 6, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/4SZW-SS5H, ref-
erencing Final Brief of Intervenors Ulandis Forte, et al (the “Wright Petitioners”), Global 
Tel*Link, Inc v Federal Communications Commission, No 15-1461, *23 n 106 (DC Cir filed 
Nov 11, 2016). The footnote cited by the intervenors did not reference Chevron by name 
but did reference statutory interpretation arguments in the FCC’s 2013 order. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id at 1:15:38–1:16:25. 
 49 Global Tel*Link, 866 F3d at 407. 
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abandoned.50 Without Chevron deference, the court invalidated 
both the intrastate rates and the use of industry-wide averages.51 
Each of the other judges on the panel offered his or her own an-
swer to whether an agency abandoning its statutory interpretation 
argument constituted a waiver of Chevron deference. Silberman 
joined Edwards’s opinion and wrote separately to say that, even 
granting Chevron deference, the order exceeded the agency’s pow-
ers.52 Because Silberman would have refused to approve the order 
even under a deferential review, he did not need to comment on 
whether Chevron had been waived. Yet Silberman explicitly en-
dorsed Edwards’s view of Chevron waiver, writing, “I especially 
agree that Chevron deference would be inappropriate in these un-
usual circumstances.”53 Judge Nina Pillard dissented.54 In her 
view, the court should look at the agency’s interpretation of the 
statute when it promulgated the rule and take no heed of a post-
promulgation attempt to waive Chevron.55 She then instructed 
the new FCC majority that, if it wanted to change the rule, the 
statute gave it the “latitude to do so” through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.56 Not only did none of the judges cite an authority for 
their conclusions about what to do when an agency abandons its 
statutory interpretation argument,57 none of them engaged with 
the extensive academic literature and case law on what Chevron 
is, how it is justified, and when it applies. Edwards cited the con-
clusion in United States v Mead Corp58 that Chevron applies to 
agency determinations having the force of law but then posited—
without reasoning—a Chevron waiver exception.59 Pillard hinted 
at a concern that the agency was doing an end run around notice 
and comment but gave no reason why such a concern should be 
decisive.60 
 
 50 Id at 408. 
 51 Id at 407–08, 412. 
 52 Id at 418 (Silberman concurring). 
 53 Global Tel*Link, 866 F3d at 418 (Silberman concurring). 
 54 Id at 419 (Pillard dissenting). 
 55 See id at 420 (asserting that “the question for us is whether the FCC’s view when 
it promulgated the challenged rule . . . was a permissible construction of the statute”) (em-
phasis added) (quotation marks omitted). 
 56 Id. 
 57 See note 73 for examples of cases in which an agency did not pursue Chevron ar-
guments but, unlike in Global Tel*Link, had no intent to change policy by doing so. 
 58 533 US 218 (2001). 
 59 Global Tel*Link, 866 F3d at 407–08. 
 60 Id at 425 (Pillard dissenting). 
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Seven weeks later, the panel retreated from its apparent 
holding that the FCC could waive Chevron deference.61 Edwards 
and Silberman joined an order amending and purportedly clari-
fying the decision. Edwards now embraced Silberman’s view that 
the FCC’s extension of authority over intrastate rates would fail 
Chevron’s second step and clarified that the use of industry-wide 
averages was arbitrary and capricious (rather than outside the 
bounds of the statute).62 Because each agency action was imper-
missible even assuming Chevron deference, the majority did not 
need to reach the question of whether the agency waived Chevron 
and whether that would be permissible.63 
The “Clarification and Amendment of the Majority Opinion” 
was more amendment than clarification. The original opinion 
quite clearly endorsed the possibility of Chevron waiver, but the 
majority, perhaps spooked by the intervenors’ en banc petition, 
which charged the court with creating a “dangerous loophole [for 
agencies] to evade judicial review,”64 attempted to read its en-
dorsement of Chevron waiver out of the opinion.65 Despite the ev-
ident shift in its approach to Chevron waiver, the majority 
claimed it was simply clarifying “any confusion” and recovering a 
“point” that may have been “lost.”66 If we take the panel at its 
word, it never held that Chevron waiver was either permissible or 
impermissible. It remains an open question whether the original 
decision’s straightforward allowance of Chevron waiver will have 
any precedential value. 
B. Defining Chevron Waiver 
Even if the initial holding in Global Tel*Link was superseded 
by the Clarification and Amendment of the Majority Opinion, it is 
 
 61 Id at 416 (Clarification and Amendment of the Majority Opinion). 
 62 Id at 417. 
 63 Global Tel*Link, 866 F3d at 417 (Clarification and Amendment of the Majority 
Opinion) (“We need not and do not decide whether we were required to follow Chevron . . . 
even though the agency declined to defend its position before the court.”). 
 64 Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Global Tel*Link, Inc v Federal Communications 
Commission, No 15-1461, *8 (DC Cir filed July 28, 2017). Note that the intervenors’ objec-
tion is nonsensical. Chevron waiver necessarily gives more opportunity for judicial review 
because, with Chevron waived, judges need not defer to agency interpretations. Chevron 
waiver is, therefore, not a loophole allowing the agency to evade judicial review. If it is a 
“dangerous loophole” to anything, Chevron waiver is a means of evading formal agency 
decision-making procedures. See Part III.D. 
 65 See Global Tel*Link, 866 F3d at 417 (Clarification and Amendment of the Majority 
Opinion). 
 66 Id. 
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still worth examining that holding. The majority reasoned that “it 
would make no sense for this court to determine whether the dis-
puted agency positions advanced in the Order warrant Chevron 
deference when the agency has abandoned those positions.”67 
That holding poses the question of why it would “make no sense.” 
To understand the rationale, we need to know whether Chevron 
arguments were sufficiently presented. If not, it would be possible 
to understand the opinion as rooted in the norm against judges 
raising issues the parties have not presented.68 But if the argu-
ments were presented, then Global Tel*Link is best read as add-
ing a threshold question before the Chevron analysis.69 Under 
that reading, courts would need to ask whether the agency seeks 
deference. Only if the agency seeks deference can deference be 
given. 
From the facts of Global Tel*Link, there are reasons to think 
the court rested its decision on some grounds other than the norm 
against judicial issue creation. The industry parties who opposed 
the order certainly briefed the statutory interpretation issue.70 
The FCC retracted its counterarguments, but the intervenors 
may have incorporated them in a footnote that referenced similar 
arguments in a previous FCC order.71 Moreover, at oral argument, 
the intervenors offered reasons for thinking that the Chevron is-
sue had been presented to the court. In its opinion, the majority 
did not attempt to rebut the intervenors’ arguments. If the inter-
venors failed to sufficiently present Chevron arguments, the 
panel did not say so. 
If the majority decided Global Tel*Link on judicial issue- 
creation grounds, the decision as a whole would not say anything 
remarkable about Chevron. Courts frequently rely on parties’ 
choices not to brief Chevron arguments.72 However, aside from 
 
 67 Id at 408. 
 68 For a survey of judicial practice when arguments are not raised, see Amanda 
Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 Duke L J 447, 462–64 (2009) (observing a general norm 
against courts raising issues sua sponte, with many significant exceptions for issues of 
subject matter jurisdiction, standing, federalism and comity constraints, preclusion, ab-
stention, sovereign immunity, and what she calls “exceptional” “merits issues”). 
 69 Professor Aaron Nielson has interpreted the DC Circuit as adopting this view. See 
Aaron Nielson, D.C. Circuit Review—Reviewed: A New Step for Chevron? (Yale J Reg: Notice 
& Comment, June 16, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/S683-46K2. 
 70 See Providers’ Brief at *40–47 (cited in note 18). 
 71 See notes 45–48 and accompanying text. 
 72 For examples of cases in which a private party failed to brief or intentionally aban-
doned Chevron, see Lubow v US Department of State, 783 F3d 877, 884 (DC Cir 2015) 
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Global Tel*Link, the cases in which courts have relied on an 
agency’s choice not to brief Chevron arguments are all cases in 
which the agency merely opted not to waste pages on unpersua-
sive or spurious arguments.73 Perhaps the norm against judicial 
issue creation should operate differently when the agency’s liti-
gating position reflects a policy choice and not a mere decision to 
prioritize its best arguments.74 But that is only a suggestion. The 
rules and customs surrounding whether judges will raise issues 
sua sponte are a vast and confounding topic that lies adjacent to 
this Comment. 
 
(finding it unnecessary to rule on Chevron’s first step “because the plaintiffs make no ar-
gument that the statute unambiguously compels their interpretation”); Albanil v Coast 2 
Coast, Inc, 444 Fed Appx 788, 796 (5th Cir 2011) (withholding Chevron deference because 
a plaintiff failed to raise it before the district court). 
 73 For examples of cases in which the agency did not seek deference, see SSC Mystic 
Operating Co, LLC v National Labor Relations Board, 801 F3d 302, 316–18 (DC Cir 2015) 
(Srinivasan concurring) (speculating that deference was not sought in Laurel Baye 
Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc v National Labor Relations Board, 564 F3d 469 (DC Cir 
2009), because the Board plausibly did not believe it had the authority to undertake juris-
dictional interpretations); MBIA Insurance Corp v Federal Deposit Insurance Corp, 708 
F3d 234, 240 (DC Cir 2013) (noting that the FDIC was not seeking deference, presumably 
because it had not promulgated a regulation interpreting the statute); Lawson v FMR 
LLC, 670 F3d 61, 82 (1st Cir 2012) (explaining that the agency correctly stipulated that 
no deference was merited); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co, a Division of ONEOK, Inc v Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 940 F2d 699, 704 (DC Cir 1991) (mentioning the agency’s 
failure to seek deference for a jurisdictional interpretation, which the Supreme Court had 
not yet determined to merit deference). 
 For a case in which the agency failed to raise Chevron arguments at the lower court, 
see Commodity Futures Trading Commission v Erskine, 512 F3d 309, 314 (6th Cir 2008) 
(noting, in addition to the forfeiture of Chevron arguments, that the agency’s interpreta-
tion was not promulgated formally enough to be accorded deference even if Chevron had 
been briefed). Sometimes an appellate court will still entertain a deference argument not 
raised at the lower court, only to determine that deference did not apply. See Colorado v 
Sunoco, Inc, 337 F3d 1233, 1243 n 4 (10th Cir 2003) (entertaining newly raised deference 
arguments because those arguments, first, were not outcome determinative and, second, 
could affect proceedings on remand). 
 74 The law of judicial issue creation is notoriously undefined and discretionary. As 
Professor Amanda Frost has put it, some exceptions to the norm are “so broadly worded 
as to essentially give courts carte blanche to raise new issues at any time.” Frost, 59 Duke 
L J at 461 (cited in note 68). Courts may have separation of powers reasons not to mechan-
ically apply the norm against judicial issue creation when the agency abandons an issue. 
When the norm is applied to agencies, it allows agencies to dramatically constrain the 
grounds upon which a court can rule. Such a practice would give the agency tremendous 
influence over the interpretation of the law while also retaining its executive functions. 
The joining of those functions in one administrative body incents the agency to promulgate 
vague rules that maximize its discretion when it faces litigation. See id at 484, citing John 
F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretation of 
Agency Rules, 96 Colum L Rev 612, 645–54 (1996). For additional normative reasons 
courts should bring up Chevron sua sponte, see Part III.D. 
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Instead, this Comment looks at whether an agency must seek 
Chevron deference in order to receive it.75 It is fair to read the 
initial Global Tel*Link opinion as resting on a theory that, to ap-
ply the Chevron framework in suits in which the agency is a party, 
an agency must have sought Chevron deference. In particular, the 
court refused to grant Chevron deference to positions advanced in 
an order because “the agency ha[d] abandoned those positions,”76 
not because none of the parties presented those positions. 
The failure to seek such deference or the intentional aban-
donment of the arguments for deference is what this Comment 
terms “Chevron waiver.” Whether an agency’s Chevron waiver 
can prevent the application of the Chevron framework is, like 
other threshold questions, a matter for Chevron Step Zero.77 This 
Comment therefore evaluates Chevron waiver at Step Zero.78 
C. The Mechanics of Chevron Waiver 
To waive Chevron, the agency’s litigators must make clear 
that they do not seek Chevron deference. They can do this in a 
number of ways. They could send a letter to the court intention-
ally abandoning an argument in their brief or, at oral argument, 
they could state that they do not seek Chevron deference.79 They 
 
 75 The possibility of Chevron waiver presumes that deference is customarily accorded 
to agencies. In other words, it presumes that Chevron is still good law. Yet Chevron is at 
risk for erosion or even elimination. Two Supreme Court justices have already signaled 
their opposition to Chevron. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v Lynch, 834 F3d 1142, 1149–58 (10th 
Cir 2016) (Gorsuch concurring); Michigan v Environmental Protection Agency, 135 S Ct 
2699, 2712–14 (2015) (Thomas concurring). The intellectual criticism of Chevron is di-
verse. See, for example, Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 Geo Wash L Rev 1187, 1189 
(2016) (regarding Chevron as an abdication of the constitutionally vested judicial power); 
Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F3d at 1153 (Gorsuch concurring) (describing Chevron as conflict-
ing with the Administrative Procedure Act); Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference 
to Executive Interpretation, 126 Yale L J 908, 999 (2017) (disputing the idea that Chevron 
is rooted in centuries-old judicial practices); Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron 
Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 
Conn L Rev 779, 784 (2010) (declaring that Chevron has increased inefficiency and confusion). 
 76 Global Tel*Link, 866 F3d at 408 (emphasis added). 
 77 See Sunstein, 92 Va L Rev at 191 (cited in note 3) (defining Step Zero as “the initial 
inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies at all”). 
 78 See Part II. 
 79 Agencies also sometimes file amicus briefs in suits that center on statutory provi-
sions the agency administers and for which the agency’s interpretations are usually given 
Chevron deference. The case that Chevron deference should not be granted if an agency 
fails to assert Chevron deference in an amicus brief is much weaker than when an agency 
is a party. Amici generally have a more attenuated stake in a case than a party. To hold 
that their briefs (and their briefs’ omissions) should narrow the grounds on which a court 
can rule would undermine the American legal system’s principled, longstanding reliance 
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could also simply fail to raise Chevron arguments before a lower 
court. This latter strategy could be termed “Chevron forfeiture.” 
When a party fails to press an argument, it is forfeited; but when 
a party voluntarily relinquishes an argument, it is waived.80 It is 
usually easier for courts to know an issue has been waived than 
that it has been forfeited because it is easier to notice an act than 
an omission. But Chevron forfeiture will be nearly as easy for a 
court to police as Chevron waiver. Chevron is generally only ap-
plicable to rules and orders that were promulgated through cer-
tain Chevron deference–signaling procedures, so, by observing 
the procedure, the court will know that Chevron could apply.81 
Moreover, these procedures force the agency to give reasons for 
its statutory interpretation in the public record. So even when the 
agency’s litigators do not seek Chevron deference at the beginning 
of litigation, the court will have access to a lengthy, published pa-
per trail that includes the reasoned statutory interpretation. A 
court that wishes to prevent Chevron waiver would be able to 
close the forfeiture loophole by deferring to the previously pub-
lished interpretation. 
Because Chevron must be waived in a court document, the 
office with the authority to waive will depend on how Congress 
has allocated litigating authority. Only the government actor 
 
on party presentation of issues. So long as one of the parties asserts that Chevron defer-
ence is merited—no matter what the agency does—Chevron arguments are not waived. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has considered a case in which the federal agency’s amicus 
brief was silent on Chevron deference but one of the parties asserted that Chevron defer-
ence should be accorded. See PUD No 1 of Jefferson County v Washington Department of 
Ecology, 511 US 700, 728–29 (1994) (Thomas dissenting). Despite the omission, the Court 
analyzed the statute under the deferential two-step Chevron standard of review. Id at 712. 
That case concerned a state agency’s interpretation of the Clean Water Act’s certification 
requirements. Rather than make a Chevron case for its own interpretation (which favored 
the state regulator), the EPA’s amicus brief argued that, even under the petitioners’ inter-
pretation of the statute, the state’s regulation was permissible. Id at 729 n 1 (Thomas 
dissenting). The Court nonetheless applied Chevron and deferred to the EPA’s interpreta-
tion. Id at 712. 
 80 See United States v Olano, 507 US 725, 733 (1993) (“Whereas forfeiture is the 
failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment 
or abandonment of a known right.’”), quoting Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464 (1938). 
 81 Courts determine whether Chevron applies by looking to the procedure the agency 
used in developing the interpretation. See text accompanying notes 137–45. Though there 
is some uncertainty about whether less common procedures trigger Chevron deference, 
the two most common “relatively formal” procedures—notice-and-comment rulemaking 
and formal adjudication—do trigger Chevron. In fact, the Supreme Court has only ever 
extended Chevron to interpretations arising under notice-and-comment rulemaking and 
formal adjudication. Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 Fordham L Rev 
527, 548 (2014). 
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with litigating authority can waive Chevron. As a general matter, 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the attorney general are 
empowered to conduct litigation in which a federal agency is a 
party.82 For cases before the Supreme Court, the attorney general 
has delegated litigating authority to the solicitor general.83 Yet 
the general grant of litigating authority is rife with exceptions. 
Many agencies—both independent and executive—have statu-
tory grants of independent litigating authority, at least at certain 
levels of litigation or over certain matters.84 Independent litigat-
ing authority is at its apex for the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC), which represents itself in all proceedings except before the 
Supreme Court,85 and at its nadir for the National Transportation 
Safety Board, which has no independent litigating authority.86 
Many of the allocations of litigating authority are quite complex. 
The Consumer Product Safety Commission, for instance, has in-
dependent litigating authority over injunctive actions in the dis-
trict courts but must have the consent of the attorney general to 
conduct its litigation in other cases, except at the Supreme Court, 
for which it never has litigating authority.87 In Global Tel*Link, 
the FCC was empowered to waive because it has litigating au-
thority over direct appeals from its orders.88 For a different agency 
or a different matter, a DOJ lawyer may have the sole authority 
to select the litigating position. 
Waiver could also occur at each step of the Chevron analysis. 
In Global Tel*Link, the FCC retracted its entire argument that it 
had authority to regulate intrastate calls, all contained in Section I 
of its brief.89 That section contained arguments relevant to each 
 
 82 28 USC § 516. 
 83 See 28 CFR § 0.20(a). 
 84 For a helpful chart distinguishing agencies without independent litigating author-
ity from those independent and executive agencies with “[f]ull or [p]artial” independent 
litigating authority, see Kirti Datla and Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent 
Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 Cornell L Rev 769, 800 (2013). 
 85 See 26 USC §§ 9010(a), 9040(a); Federal Election Commission v NRA Political Victory 
Fund, 513 US 88, 96 (1994). The FEC may represent itself before the Court in the narrow 
set of cases involving the presidential election funds. Id at 94. 
 86 See Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over 
Independent Agency Litigation, 82 Cal L Rev 255, 278 (1994). 
 87 15 USC §§ 2071(a), 2076(b)(7). 
 88 See Devins, 82 Cal L Rev at 279 (cited in note 86). The FCC has litigating authority 
over appeals from its orders (except before the Supreme Court), but the DOJ handles “ac-
tions launched in district court.” Id. FCC lawyers and DOJ lawyers frequently collaborate. 
DOJ lawyers were listed on the FCC’s Global*Tel Link brief but not on its letter retracting 
Chevron arguments. FCC Brief at *66 (cited in note 41); Jan 31 Letter at *2 (cited in note 34). 
 89 See Jan 31 Letter at *1 (cited in note 34). 
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step of the Chevron analysis. The agency abandoned its Step Zero 
argument that its interpretations of its own jurisdiction merited 
Chevron deference.90 It abandoned its Step One argument that 
the statute was ambiguous.91 And it abandoned an elaborate Step 
Two argument that its interpretation was reasonable.92 The DC 
Circuit treated the abandonment of all three arguments at the 
logically primary step, Step Zero, holding that, because the 
agency failed to seek deference, the whole of Chevron analysis 
would not be applied. 
Yet not all Chevron waiver includes all three steps. At each 
Chevron step, the agency could withdraw all arguments or stipu-
late that it disagrees with the deference-friendly view. For exam-
ple, at Step Zero the agency could make no claims about whether 
Chevron deference is merited or it could explicitly state that def-
erence is not merited. Either example would act as a Chevron 
waiver. That is, either one would implicate a rule that an agency 
must seek deference in order to get it. 
Waiver gets more complicated if it inheres at Chevron’s later 
steps—and some of the circumstances are beyond the scope of this 
Comment. An agency that does not want its regulation to receive 
deference could “waive” at Step One rather than Step Zero. It 
would agree that the regulation is of the sort that merits the 
Chevron framework but either withdraw its argument that the 
statute is ambiguous or, more emphatically, argue that the stat-
ute unambiguously forecloses the regulation.93 At Step Two, the 
agency could argue that the interpretation is unreasonable or 
make no argument about reasonableness. One common way in 
which an agency “waives” Step Two is by asserting that Chevron 
analysis concludes (in the agency’s favor) at Step One. The agency 
argues the statute unambiguously demands its interpretation 
and thus the agency does not submit Step Two arguments about 
the reasonableness of its interpretation. Sometimes, in a move 
called Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, the court will decide that 
the statute is ambiguous and remand to the agency rather than 
apply Step Two.94 
 
 90 See FCC Brief at *27 (cited in note 41). 
 91 Id at *28. 
 92 Id at *28–38. 
 93 An agency cannot, however, argue that the court should defer to its new reasoning. 
See Bowen v Georgetown University Hospital, 488 US 204, 212–13 (1988). 
 94 Chevron Step-One-and-a-Half doctrine is largely a creation of the DC Circuit. For 
a comprehensive discussion of how it operates and when agencies might take advantage 
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D. The Varieties of Chevron Waiver 
This Section describes the circumstances under which we 
might expect an agency to try to waive Chevron.95 Because Chevron 
increases an agency’s interpretive powers, the more interesting 
question is when an agency might be motivated to waive Chevron, 
but it’s worth first spelling out the elementary conditions of Chevron 
waiver. For one, waiver is a midlitigation action, so there must be 
ongoing litigation. Not only that, the agency action being con-
tested must turn, to some extent, on a question of statutory inter-
pretation. It would make no sense to waive Chevron in an arbitrary-
and-capricious challenge that would never be subject to deferen-
tial review under Chevron. Lastly, because Chevron waiver weak-
ens the agency’s position, the agency will waive only when it de-
sires to reverse the action for which it has been sued. 
Yet Chevron waiver will not be used every time the agency 
wants to reverse its actions. Some agency actions can be undone 
more easily and predictably through means other than Chevron 
waiver. An agency that uses Chevron waiver must still inform the 
court of its waiver, show up for oral argument, and leave the fate 
of the agency action in the hands of a judicial panel. It is not par-
ticularly onerous, but it is more onerous and more uncertain than 
the simple revocation of, say, a guidance document.96 Chevron 
waiver is, however, always less onerous—if more uncertain—
 
of it, see generally Daniel J. Hemel and Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 
84 U Chi L Rev 757 (2017). 
 95 Throughout this Section, I will speak of the “agency” as the actor who waives Chevron. 
Yet as already noted, a litigator must waive Chevron. That litigator could be an employee 
of the agency that promulgated the rule or an employee of an agency within the DOJ, such 
as the Office of the Solicitor General or the Civil Division. If a DOJ attorney waives, it 
could be at the behest of the promulgating agency or another official within the executive 
branch. “Agency” provides a useful simplification, encompassing waiver by the agency’s 
counsel and by DOJ lawyers at the behest of the promulgating agency. It also follows from 
the Global Tel*Link panel’s emphasis on the agency’s abandonment of the pro-Chevron 
position. See Global Tel*Link, 866 F3d at 408. For the complexities introduced by the di-
vision of litigating authority, see notes 118–21 and accompanying text. 
 96 That is, unless the guidance document is a “significant” guidance document, which 
has been subject to interagency review at least since the George W. Bush administration. 
See generally Office of Management and Budget, Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance 
Practices, 72 Fed Reg 3432 (2007). A guidance document is significant if it has an effect 
on the economy of at least $100 million or “adversely affect[s] in a material way the econ-
omy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public 
health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities”; creates an incon-
sistency with another agency; “[m]aterially alter[s] the budgetary impact of entitlements, 
grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof”; or 
“[r]aise[s] novel legal or policy issues.” Id at 3439. 
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than undertaking the multimonth (or longer) procedures neces-
sary to issue a new rule,97 revoke an old one,98 or, if applicable, 
conduct a new adjudication.99 
In addition to the different costs to the agency of promulga-
tion and Chevron waiver, there may also be a different reward. 
An interpretation that goes through notice and comment gener-
ally cannot be rescinded except through notice and comment.100 
But a judicial interpretation after Chevron has been waived may 
be even “stickier.”101 A judicial decision at Step One rather than 
Step Two binds future administrations.102 That is, even after no-
tice and comment, future administrations cannot promulgate an 
interpretation that a court has said is unambiguously foreclosed. 
For instance, the administration cannot replace an interpretation 
that a court has said is the unambiguous command of the statute. 
The rule applies whether a court has explicitly resolved the case 
at Chevron Step One or determines that the statute is unambig-
uous even without applying Chevron analysis.103 An agency con-
sidering whether to waive Chevron must consider whether the 
 
 97 See 5 USC § 553. 
 98 See Federal Communications Commission v Fox Television Stations, Inc, 556 US 
502, 515–16 (2009). 
 99 See 5 USC §§ 554, 556–57. 
 100 See Perez v Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 S Ct 1199, 1206 (2015) (explaining 
that the Administrative Procedure Act requires that “agencies use the same procedures 
when they amend or repeal a rule as they used to issue the rule in the first instance”), 
citing Fox Television, 556 US at 515. 
 101 For a discussion of why agencies would desire “stickier” interpretations rather 
than simple flexibility, see Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U Chi L Rev 85, 117–
25 (2018) (“[T]he ability to make credible commitments matters because agencies have 
more long-term options if regulated parties trust that agency policies are durable.”). 
 102 See National Cable & Telecommunications Association v Brand X Internet Services, 
545 US 967, 982–83 (2005). 
 103 Id at 984–85 (holding that AT&T Corp v City of Portland, 216 F3d 871 (9th Cir 
2000), which did not analyze the regulation under Chevron, did not bind the agency be-
cause it described its reading of the statute as the best one, not the only permissible one, 
implying that its interpretation would have been binding had it said its interpretation was 
unambiguously commanded by the statute). See also UC Health v National Labor Relations 
Board, 803 F3d 669, 688 (DC Cir 2015) (Silberman dissenting): 
The first [question Brand X addresses is] how [ ] reviewing courts deal with a 
pre-Chevron judicial decision if the agency subsequently disagrees. The Supreme 
Court explained that if a prior judicial decision announced the only acceptable 
interpretation of a statute that opinion governed, but if the earlier judicial opin-
ion—properly read—only relied on a better interpretation, the agency was free 
to adopt a different reasonable construction. 
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court is more likely to bind future administrations if it is analyz-
ing the statute under Chevron’s two steps or in their absence.104 
It then must consider how confident it is that the court will read 
the statute in the way that it now prefers. The best-case scenario 
for an agency that wants to reverse a policy is for the court to read 
the newly favored interpretation as the unambiguous command 
of the statute, binding future administrations. The worst-case 
scenario is for the court to bind the agency to an interpretation it 
disfavors. If Chevron waiver increases the chances of a binding 
judicial interpretation, then waiver is a high-risk, high-reward 
choice. Even if Chevron waiver decreases the chances of a binding 
interpretation, the agency takes a gamble when it waives because 
it relies on the court to reverse a policy it could reverse on its own, 
albeit more burdensomely. 
No matter whether Chevron waiver increases or decreases 
the chances that future administrations will be bound, it is clear 
that Chevron waiver arises when the agency tries to reverse a 
policy that was promulgated in a binding manner. We can classify 
six broad categories of circumstances that would lead an agency 
to reverse such a policy. The first two come after a presidential 
transition. The next four all involve the same administration 
seeking to undo its own policy, distinguishing political from tech-
nical motivations and agency-initiated reversals from White 
House–initiated ones. 
The first scenario is what happened in Global Tel*Link: a 
presidential transition changed agency policy while litigation was 
ongoing.105 Courts can always avoid the possibility of Chevron 
waiver in these instances by holding the case in abeyance until 
the new administration determines whether it wants to retract 
its rule. But there might be good reasons not to delay argument, 
such as the desire for relief for inmate families that the court 
found persuasive in Global Tel*Link.106 
The presidential transition is especially ripe for Chevron 
waiver. Modern congressional gridlock means that the postelec-
tion political capital of a new administration must be spent 
largely through administrative actions. Such capital has a short 
half-life, and so it must be spent quickly. New agency officials, 
 
 104 We do not know whether Chevron waiver makes a court any more likely to resolve 
the issue at Step One in favor of the agency’s newfound preferences; it’s an empirical ques-
tion with a very small data set. 
 105 See generally Jan 31 Letter (cited in note 34). 
 106 See generally Jan 18 Order (cited in note 35). 
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moreover, will seek to change many binding rules but only have 
so much latitude to do so, especially if they encounter bureau-
cratic resistance.107 Chevron waiver is a means of reversing 
agency policy that generally imposes fewer costs on the agency 
than the alternatives. 
A second scenario also follows a presidential transition. In 
this scenario, however, litigation begins after the new agency 
leadership has taken their role, perhaps tacitly invited by agency 
leadership. This is similar to the “sue and settle” practice, in 
which an agency invites a sympathetic nongovernmental organi-
zation to sue the agency for failing to undertake a regulatory ac-
tion, which is then mandated by a consent decree. Like Chevron 
waiver, “sue and settle” is a means of averting the rigors of notice 
and comment or interagency review, the White House’s somewhat 
prolonged process for subjecting certain agency actions to cost-
benefit analysis and otherwise bringing them in line with the ad-
ministration’s priorities.108 
The other scenarios do not involve a presidential transition. 
Instead, the same administration has changed its policy. We can 
divide these scenarios along two axes: the motivation for the 
change and the actor initiating it. 
FIGURE 1:  EXAMPLES OF INTRA-ADMINISTRATION POLICY 
REVERSAL 




Issue not subject to inter-
agency review becomes 
politically controversial. 




Agency is heavily lob-
bied post-promulgation; 
priorities of DOJ run 
contrary to that of the 
promulgating agency. 
New information rele-
vant to action changes 
agency’s mind; DOJ has 
litigating authority and 
is concerned with impli-
cations from agency’s 
construction of statute. 
 
 107 The previous administration will have tried to promulgate rules through notice 
and comment, knowing they are hard to rescind. See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: 
Entrenching Policies and Personnel before a New President Arrives, 78 NYU L Rev 557, 
592–93 (2003). 
 108 See generally William L. Kovacs, Keith W. Holman, and Jonathan A. Jackson, Sue 
and Settle: Regulating behind Closed Doors (US Chamber of Commerce, May 2013), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/5MWP-UA4N. 
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Agencies are given more leeway to reverse their policies than 
are, say, courts following stare decisis because agencies are de-
signed to be able to expertly respond to a changing world and to 
be (somewhat) responsive to popular opinion.109 Individual esti-
mations of agencies’ capacity for genuine expertise or genuine re-
sponsiveness will differ. Because one might be more solicitous of 
agency claims to expertise and less solicitous of claims to respon-
siveness, or vice versa,110 it’s worth separating out these two fac-
tors, at least conceptually. Hence, we should make a distinction 
between agency reversals rooted in technical expertise and 
agency reversals rooted in policy concerns. In the former, the 
agency responds to new evidence coming to light. In the latter, 
the agency responds to pressures from the president, Congress, 
various interest groups, or even to nontechnical judgments made 
by the agency staff itself. 
Though we may be able to conceptually separate technical 
agency motivations from political agency motivations, in practice 
courts are likely to struggle with the distinction. Take, for exam-
ple, Food and Drug Administration v Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp,111 which concerned the agency’s decision to reverse decades 
of agency policy and regulate tobacco as a drug. Was this a tech-
nical decision motivated by the accumulation of evidence of to-
bacco’s harmful effects or a political decision under pressure from 
both the president and specific lobbies? The answer in Brown & 
Williamson is undoubtedly both. The difficulty of separating the 
political from the technical is not limited to issues of vast public 
consequence.112 One reason is that social scientific techniques of-
ten rest on a series of subjective commitments or observations.113 
What’s more, political pressures on the agencies have only grown, 
 
 109 See Randy J. Kozel and Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA 
L Rev 112, 137 (2011). In their article, Professors Randy Kozel and Jeffrey Pojanowski 
chronicle the various ways in which administrative policy change is and is not subject to 
higher standards of review. Id at 138–59. 
 110 See Jeremy Rabkin, Judicial Compulsions: How Public Law Distorts Public Policy 
95–105 (Basic Books 1989) (contrasting a Weberian confidence in technically proficient 
bureaucracy with the view of The Federalist, which thought that delegating executive re-
sponsibility to popular government was the best means to good social policy). 
 111 529 US 120 (2000). 
 112 See, for example, Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 
95 Colum L Rev 1613, 1617 (1995) (referencing the phenomenon of “camouflaging contro-
versial policy decisions as science”). 
 113 See F.A. Hayek, The Counter-revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason 
41–60 (Liberty Fund 1979). 
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even on seemingly narrow issues.114 Recognizing the reality of 
congressional gridlock, industry and activist groups have devoted 
much more attention to influencing administrative outcomes, in-
cluding through more oblique means, such as public relations 
campaigns, lobbying Congress, and ex parte communications.115 
Such pressures not only mix the political with the technical, but 
they can overpower administrative norms, including, relevant for 
our purposes, the norm that agencies adopt litigation positions 
that defend their chosen policy.116 
Then there is the question of who initiates the policy change. 
Frequently, this will be the president, who intervenes and cajoles 
the litigator into changing its position, which the agency initially 
developed largely without presidential input. President-initiated 
waiver is more plausible for low-impact actions that evaded inter-
agency review when they were developed117 but that, upon imple-
mentation, attract public attention. Actions that merit the ire of 
more sophisticated regulated parties are more likely to attract 
presidential attention during the comment phase of the initial 
promulgation, so this scenario is probably limited to actions that 
affect less sophisticated parties. 
The litigator could also initiate the change. Here the question 
of litigating authority becomes paramount.118 Chevron could be 
waived by an agency with independent litigating authority when 
it discovers new evidence, seeks to quietly undermine a presiden-
tial priority, or perhaps when the agency’s counsel disagrees with 
its technical staff and the agency head tolerates the reversal. 
 
 114 See McGarity, 61 Duke L J at 1704–10 (cited in note 9). Professor Thomas 
McGarity largely laments this trend and credits much of it to right-of-center groups who 
have more foundational disagreements with the regulatory state. Id at 1709–10. But ad-
ministrative law is unlikely to successfully counter the expansion of the range of view-
points in our politics. Administrative law must instead adapt to the breakdown of any 
technocratic consensus. 
 115 Id. 
 116 One possible answer to the question of why agencies have not tried to waive Chevron 
before is that the increased pressures on the agencies have eroded the norms that kept 
past agencies from so obviously undermining their promulgated policy. 
 117 Agencies frequently act to insulate themselves from presidential review by opting 
to proceed by adjudication, crafting rules that fall just beneath the significance threshold 
for interagency review, burying the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
in technical substance, forcing OIRA to review their products under tight statutory dead-
lines, and seeking out coalition partners among the many staffers who together make up 
the White House. See Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation under Presidential Review, 126 
Harv L Rev 1755, 1782–1803 (2013). 
 118 See Elizabeth Magill and Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power within Agencies, 120 
Yale L J 1032, 1060 (2011) (hypothesizing about the incentives created by the inconsistent 
allocation of independent litigating authority). 
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Chevron waiver when the DOJ has litigating authority, by con-
trast, could reflect a difference in policy priorities between the ex-
pert agency and the attorney general.119 One could even imagine 
a situation in which the dispute between the attorney general and 
the agency is technical. For example, the agency’s interpretation 
of a statute it administers might have implications for how other 
statutes are read, compromising administrative priorities. Like-
wise, in cases before the Supreme Court, the solicitor general 
might be torn between his role as a lawyer for the government 
and his role as the “Tenth Justice,” the Court’s expert partner in 
interpreting the law.120 He might drop Chevron arguments he 
thinks are meritless or that would create an undesirable prece-
dent. Alternatively, he might see the president as his client and 
undermine the aims of the independent agency.121 
With the current sample size of one, it is impossible to know 
which actors and which motivations will most often lead to Chevron 
waiver or if Chevron waiver is largely a post-transition phenome-
non. Returning to Figure 1, we do not know if Chevron waiver is 
most likely in the political/White House–initiated, political/agency-
initiated, technical/White House–initiated, or technical/agency-
initiated circumstance. However, we should expect the motivation 
and initiating-actor axes to interact. Because the president is gen-
erally considered to be more of a political actor than the agencies, 
we expect political reversals to be disproportionately provoked by 
the president and technical reversals by the agency. Yet that ex-
pectation does not exclude the possibility of the opposite scenarios. 
The president can also reverse policy for technical reasons—for 
instance, the White House’s Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) can adjust its cost-benefit assumptions—and 
agency motivations may be political too. Though we cannot know 
which motivations and which actions will most often spark a pol-
icy reversal, the combinations of possibilities are common enough 
that, if permitted, agencies will from time to time seek to use 
Chevron waiver. 
 
 119 Id at 1060–61. 
 120 See Michael W. McConnell, The Rule of Law and the Role of the Solicitor General, 
21 Loyola LA L Rev 1105, 1106 (1988) (describing different approaches to the solicitor 
general’s responsibilities). 
 121 But see Devins, 82 Cal L Rev at 290 (cited in note 86) (“While the Solicitor General 
may seek to moderate the independent agency’s position because of competing agency or 
executive interests, he rarely tosses aside the independent agencies’ views.”). 
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II.  CHEVRON WAIVER AND THE STEP ZERO DOCTRINE 
A hypothetical doctrine prohibiting Chevron waiver—or al-
ternatively, specifying that an agency must seek Chevron defer-
ence in order to be given Chevron deference—would apply at 
Chevron’s “Step Zero,” which asks whether a given agency action 
is even subject to the Chevron inquiry.122 This Part describes the 
major Step Zero cases, which have established a murky doctrine, 
and then applies that doctrine, by its own terms, to a situation in 
which the agency has abandoned its interpretation in litigation. 
As Part II.B explains, the doctrinal formulations of Step Zero do 
not resolve the question of Chevron waiver. But building on the 
Step Zero cases Part II.A lays out, Part III applies Step Zero’s 
deeper intuitions about Chevron and the reasonable Congress to 
conclude Chevron deference should not be waivable. 
A. Defining Step Zero 
Before Chevron, courts relied on a number of factors to cali-
brate the scrutiny they accorded agency actions.123 The Chevron 
opinion, however, appeared to suggest that deference does not 
vary with the agency’s persuasiveness.124 Instead, it identified a 
category of agency actions that are accorded deference and a two-
step test for applying that deferential review.125 And Chevron  
 
 122 Note that even “waivers” at Step One or Step Two would apply at Step Zero. An 
agency that refuses to argue the statute is ambiguous (Step One Waiver) and an agency 
that refuses to argue the interpretation of an ambiguous statute is reasonable (Step Two 
Waiver) would take those positions because it does not seek deference. Under a rule that 
the Chevron framework cannot be applied when the agency does not seek deference, such 
Step One and Two Waivers would bar the application of the Chevron framework—just like 
any other agency action that fails Step Zero. 
 123 See Skidmore v Swift & Co, 323 US 134, 140 (1944) (according deference to agency 
judgments depending “upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of 
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors 
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control”). 
 124 Chevron, 467 US at 842–43. 
 125 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 
1989 Duke L J 511, 516. See also Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 
71 Geo Wash L Rev 347, 348 (2003) (“The Chevron opinion itself is best read as an attempt 
to simplify and clarify the preexisting, and notoriously muddled, law of deference to agency 
interpretations.”). Yet not all have accepted the view that Chevron replaced the Skidmore 
deference standard with a Chevron deference rule. As both justice and judge, Stephen 
Breyer has taken the opposite view, arguing that Chevron merely added a factor—hypo-
thetical congressional intent—to the multifactor analysis in Skidmore. See Christensen v 
Harris County, 529 US 576, 596 (Breyer dissenting). See also Stephen Breyer, Judicial 
Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin L Rev 363, 380–81 (1986). As a conse-
quence of this interpretation, Breyer has favored a more standard-like conception of Chevron. 
See SAS Institute Inc v Iancu, 138 S Ct 1348, 1364 (2018) (Breyer dissenting) (describing 
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introduced a new justification for deferring to agency interpreta-
tions: a construction of congressional understanding.126 Courts 
should defer to agency interpretations of statutes because Congress 
allocated interpretive authority to the agency.127 Some allocations 
provide explicit permission for gap filling, which therefore merits 
deference unless “manifestly contrary to the statute.”128 More 
commonly, the allocation of interpretive authority is implicit. 
Even then, the court cannot substitute its reading of the statute 
for the agency’s reasonable interpretation.129 
But Chevron offered little guidance for determining which 
category of agency actions merited deference.130 It was not clear 
whether Chevron deference was tied to the specific procedure that 
generated the interpretation or if it depended on whether the in-
terpretation was legally binding.131 Actions taken after more rig-
orous agency procedures and actions that have the force of law 
are not wholly coextensive. Many binding regulations avoid notice 
 
Chevron as “rule of thumb” in the only paragraph of his dissent which Justice Elena Kagan 
did not sign). The court has oscillated between these two views. See text accompanying 
notes 134–47. 
 126 See Smiley v Citibank (South Dakota), NA, 517 US 735, 740–41 (1996) (character-
izing Chevron as justifying deference in “a presumption that Congress . . . understood that 
the ambiguity would be resolved . . . by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than 
the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows”). 
 127 Chevron, 467 US at 843–44. See also Scialabba v Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S Ct 2191, 
2214 (2014) (Roberts concurring) (“Courts defer to an agency’s reasonable construction of 
an ambiguous statute because we presume that Congress intended to assign responsibility 
to resolve the ambiguity to the agency.”). 
 128 Chevron, 467 US at 843–44. 
 129 Id at 844. 
 130 Chevron’s one clear limiting principle is that it applies only to an agency’s “con-
struction of the statute which it administers.” Id at 842 (emphasis added). Later courts 
have read Chevron to limit deference to agency interpretations of statutes that Congress 
charged the particular agency with administering. See Smiley, 517 US at 739. Hence, statutes 
that are administered by no single agency, like the Administrative Procedure Act, Pub L 
No 79-404, 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified at 5 USC § 500 et seq, or the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488 (1993), codified at 42 USC § 2000bb–
2000bb-4, are not thought to grant agency interpretations Chevron deference. See Thomas 
W. Merrill, Step Zero after City of Arlington, 83 Fordham L Rev 753, 759–60 (2014). 
 131 See Christensen, 529 US at 587: 
Here, however, we confront an interpretation contained in an opinion letter, not 
one arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. Interpretations such as those in opinion letters—like interpreta-
tions contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guide-
lines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference. 
Christensen, decided a year before Mead, did not specify whether these latter interpreta-
tions did not warrant Chevron deference because they were promulgated under less rigor-
ous procedures, or because they lacked the force of law, or both, or neither. 
2018] Waiving Chevron 1953 
 
and comment, whether through the good cause exception132 or by 
going through other means of promulgation, such as negotiated 
rulemaking.133 
Mead seemingly resolved the question of what triggers Chevron 
while adding complications of its own. Chevron analysis is 
prompted, the Court said, “when it appears that Congress dele-
gated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying 
the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming def-
erence was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”134 
Chevron’s Step Zero therefore begins from a construction of the 
enacting Congress’s intent. That Congress required “relatively 
formal” procedures like notice and comment for agency action is 
not dispositive, but it is a “very good indicator” of an intention to 
endow the agency with the authority to interpret ambiguities in 
the statute with the force of law.135 The force of law inquiry was 
presumably emphasized because, when an agency acts with the 
same force over private conduct as Congress is capable of when it 
exercises its statutory authority, gaps and ambiguities in the 
statute could be said to deputize the agency as a kind of junior 
legislator.136 
Mead did not elaborate much on which clues beyond “rela-
tively formal” procedures suggest congressional intent to endow 
the agency with the power to act with the force of law.137 A few 
considerations are implicit in Mead’s reasoning. Chevron defer-
ence is more plausible when the action (1) has precedential value, 
(2) is binding on third parties, (3) is promulgated high in the 
 
 132 See 5 USC § 553(b)(B). 
 133 See 5 USC §§ 561–70. 
 134 Mead, 533 US at 226–27. Scholars contest whether Mead posited that “force of 
law” is an independent criterion for which agency procedures like notice and comment are 
evidence. The opinion is something of a mess, having finessed several views among the 
justices to obtain eight votes. See Merrill, 83 Fordham L Rev at 766–67 (cited in note 130). 
 135 Mead, 533 US at 229–30. 
 136 See John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 Tex L Rev 
113, 199–202 (1998); Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 
Georgetown L J 833, 876–79 (2001). But see Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 
Notre Dame L Rev 273, 288 (2011): 
One can read authority to act with the force of law as implying a designation of 
interpretive primacy only if one engages in the semantic sleight of hand of equat-
ing creating policy within the bounds of the statute with resolving gaps and am-
biguities in the statute. But they are not the same. Filling in gaps and clarifying 
ambiguities means resolving issues about what the statute requires and prohib-
its, while creating policy-based rules means adding legal requirements that nei-
ther permit what the statute prohibits nor prohibit what the statute requires. 
 137 See Hickman, 83 Fordham L Rev at 533 (cited in note 81). 
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agency hierarchy, or when (4) the volume of actions of the same 
type is not too high.138 Justice Antonin Scalia, who had celebrated 
the categorical nature of Chevron, denigrated this approach as 
“th’ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances’ test.”139 
The analysis quickly became even less rule-based. A year after 
Mead, Justice Stephen Breyer, who had long argued deference 
should vary with the circumstances, wrote for the Court in Barnhart 
v Walton.140 Barnhart described a five-factor Step Zero test in 
which Chevron’s application depends on some combination of 
whether (1) the interpretation is “interstitial,” (2) the agency acts 
within its expertise, (3) the interpretive question is important “to 
administration of the statute,” (4) administration is complex, or 
(5) the agency has given the question “careful consideration . . . 
over a long period of time.”141 Five years after that, Breyer, again 
writing for the Court, laid out a different set of factors.142 As in 
Mead, each multifactor test evaluated whether Congress in-
tended to allocate interpretive authority to the agency.143 
Though Mead pushed the Step Zero inquiry in a more holistic 
direction, with the ultimate focus on whether the agency acted 
with the force of law, agency procedure still plays an essential role 
in Step Zero. In practice, the lower courts generally extend Chevron 
analysis only to the products of notice-and-comment rulemakings 
 
 138 See Mead, 533 US at 232–34. See also Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has 
Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 Vand L Rev 1443, 1452–53 (2005). 
 139 Mead, 533 US at 241 (Scalia dissenting). Scalia proposed instead that all “author-
itative” agency interpretations trigger Chevron analysis. See id; Christensen, 529 US at 
591 (Scalia concurring). Chevron waiver would be relatively straightforward under the 
authoritativeness test. Interpretations that “represent the judgment of central agency 
management, approved at the highest levels” are authoritative, including the opinion of 
the general counsel for the agency. Mead, 533 US at 258 n 6 (Scalia dissenting). A general 
counsel’s declaration that the agency had abandoned the interpretation would probably 
mean it was no longer authoritative and thus not subject to Chevron deference. By the 
logic of Scalia’s Mead and Christensen opinions, Chevron waiver is likely permissible. 
 140 535 US 212 (2002). 
 141 Id at 222. 
 142 See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd v Coke, 551 US 158, 173–74 (2007). Breyer 
looked to whether the agency rule “sets forth important individual rights and duties,” the 
agency “focuses fully and directly upon the issue,” the agency “uses full notice-and-comment 
procedures,” “the resulting rule falls within the statutory grant of authority,” and “the rule 
itself is reasonable.” Id. 
 143 See Barnhart, 535 US at 225 (“[The factors] lead us to read the statute as delegat-
ing to the Agency considerable authority to fill in, through interpretation, matters of detail 
related to its administration.”); Long Island Care at Home, 551 US at 173 (“[T]he ultimate 
question is whether Congress would have intended, and expected, courts to treat an 
agency’s rule, regulation, application of a statute, or other agency action as within, or out-
side, its delegation to the agency of ‘gap-filling’ authority.”). 
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and formal adjudications.144 The Supreme Court, in particular, 
pays close attention to procedure. “[P]ost-Mead,” Professor Kristin 
Hickman observed that “the Court has never actually extended 
Chevron deference to interpretations lacking with notice-and-
comment rulemaking or relatively formal adjudication proce-
dures.”145 Moreover, when Scalia had the opportunity to write for 
the Court in 2013’s City of Arlington, Texas v Federal Communi-
cations Commission,146 he eschewed any multifactor inquiry and, 
at least in dicta, treated notice-and-comment rulemaking or for-
mal adjudication as the triggers for Chevron analysis.147 
Cases in which the agency has proceeded by notice-and- 
comment rulemaking or formal adjudication are the easy Step 
Zero cases. The agency has proceeded relatively formally and acts 
with the force of law, so Chevron analysis is applied. In harder 
cases, however, the lower courts often supplement Mead’s force-
of-law question by looking to a broader range of factors, merging 
or selecting between those factors articulated in Barnhart and 
those factors implicit in Mead.148 
B. Applying Step Zero 
Chevron waiver is most likely when the agency has no less 
onerous means of reversing policy. By and large, agency policies 
without the force of law can be reversed relatively straightfor-
wardly and agency policies with the force of law can only be re-
versed through means more onerous than Chevron waiver.149 
 
 144 See Hickman, 83 Fordham L Rev at 551 (cited in note 81). 
 145 Id at 548. 
 146 569 US 290 (2013). 
 147 See id at 307. See also Patrick J. Smith, Chevron Step Zero after City of Arlington, 
140 Tax Notes 713, 718 (2013) (suggesting that City of Arlington tacitly replaced Mead’s 
multifactor inquiry). 
 148 For descriptions of how circuit courts have examined the harder Step Zero cases, 
see Hickman, 83 Fordham L Rev at 551 (cited in note 81); Bressman, 58 Vand L Rev at 
1459–64 (cited in note 138). Though many circuits fight their way through the thicket of Mead 
and Barnhart factors when faced with an agency action that is neither a legislative rule 
nor a formal adjudication, others find ways to avoid this complex inquiry altogether. See 
Daniel S. Brookins, Essay, Confusion in the Circuit Courts: How the Circuit Courts Are 
Solving the Mead-Puzzle by Avoiding It Altogether, 85 Geo Wash L Rev 1484, 1496–1500 
(2017) (describing Step Zero avoidance as the “norm” in the hard cases). One way of avoid-
ing hard Step Zero cases is to determine that the action fails Step Two and so the court 
need not reach the Step Zero question. Id at 1497, citing California Department of Social 
Services v Thompson, 321 F3d 835 (9th Cir 2003), and Cook v Food & Drug Administration, 
733 F3d 1 (DC Cir 2013). Eventually Global Tel*Link took this tack. See Global Tel*Link, 
866 F3d at 417 (Clarification and Amendment of the Majority Opinion). 
 149 See text accompanying notes 96–99. 
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Agencies will thus try to waive deference only when an interpre-
tation has the force of law—the same circumstance in which the 
interpretation, under Mead, is entitled to Chevron deference.150 
But that an interpretation is entitled to deference does not mean 
the agency cannot waive that entitlement. Mead is silent on 
whether Chevron is mandatory for such interpretations.151 
Chevron waiver is one of those harder cases in which a court 
could turn to the factors latent in Mead or enumerated in Barnhart. 
But most of the factors bear no relation to the Chevron-waiver 
situation. All we know about a theoretical case of Chevron waiver 
is that the agency wants to abandon its previous interpretation, 
which would usually be entitled to Chevron deference. An inter-
pretation that the agency now wants to reverse may be intersti-
tial, or it may not be. The fact that the agency wants to reverse it 
tells us next to nothing about its interstitiality, its complexity, its 
foundation in expertise (after all, reversals can have technical or 
political motivations), its bindingness, its importance to the ad-
ministration of the statute, or the volume of actions of a similar 
type. Likewise, though the Mead court was more comfortable with 
deference if the interpretation came from a higher-ranking offi-
cial, it is not evident that Chevron waiver empowers or disempowers 
higher-ranking officials. A president may urge Chevron waiver to 
undermine the interpretation of an agency staffer, but a lawyer 
in the Justice Department may also use Chevron waiver to under-
mine the interpretation of the agency. 
Barnhart’s “careful consideration . . . over a long period of 
time”152 factor applies to Chevron waiver but still gives little guid-
ance. While the initial interpretation was likely developed 
through a procedure like notice and comment that ensured some 
care was taken, the agency’s newly preferred interpretation has 
no such assurances. Hence, Barnhart may suggest that Chevron 
 
 150 With a few independently justified exceptions, such as the major-question doc-
trine. See note 153. 
 151 A fine-toothed reading of Mead might suggest an answer. “We have recognized a 
very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment,” Mead says, “in express 
congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that 
produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.” Mead, 533 US at 229 (em-
phasis added). But it would be too lawyerly to treat this sentence as pronouncing that a 
claim of deference is a necessary element of a grant of deference. The Court mentions that 
deference was claimed in order to specify that the Court is not granting general deference 
to the agency. Rather, congressional authorization to rulemake grants deference for the 
resulting rules and congressional authorization to adjudicate grants deference for the re-
sulting orders. 
 152 Barnhart, 535 US at 222. 
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cannot be waived. But all this factor does is suggest that the orig-
inal interpretation merited deference. When the agency waives, it 
is not asking for deference for any alternative interpretation that 
may not have been carefully promulgated; it is merely inviting 
the court to determine the best interpretation, without deference. 
Again we reach the question of whether the Mead and Barnhart 
factors entitle an interpretation to deference or make deference 
mandatory—a question those cases do not address. Instead of ap-
plying Step Zero as a doctrinal test, we need to look to the princi-
ples that constructed that doctrinal test in the first place. 
III.  CHEVRON WAIVER AND THE REASONABLE CONGRESS 
The murky tests of Step Zero are a function of its conceptual 
ambition. Namely, the Step Zero cases—from Chevron to Mead to 
Barnhart—all try to grant Chevron deference when Congress 
would intend to allocate interpretive authority to the agency and 
withhold Chevron deference when Congress would not.153 Step 
Zero focuses on congressional intent because Chevron deference 
is justified by a construction of congressional intent.154 
 
 153 This includes the “major questions” exception to Chevron’s domain that runs par-
allel to the Mead doctrine. For a concise description of the major-questions doctrine as a 
Chevron Step Zero issue, see United States Telecom Association v Federal Communications 
Commission, 855 F3d 381, 418–23 (DC Cir 2017) (Kavanaugh dissenting) (“For an agency 
to issue a major rule, Congress must clearly authorize the agency to do so. If a statute only 
ambiguously supplies authority for the major rule, the rule is unlawful.”). Notably, in his 
United States Telecom Association dissent, then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh observes that the 
Supreme Court has rooted the major-questions exception in both a nondelegation canon 
and in “a presumption that Congress intends to make major policy decisions itself, not 
leave those decisions to agencies.” Id at 419 (Kavanaugh dissenting). See, for example, 
King v Burwell, 135 S Ct 2480, 2488–89 (2015) (applying the major-questions exception at 
Step Zero and withholding Chevron deference in “extraordinary cases” in which it is im-
plausible “that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation”); Utility Air Regulatory 
Group v Environmental Protection Agency, 134 S Ct 2427, 2444 (2014) (“We expect Congress 
to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political 
significance.’”); Gonzales v Oregon, 546 US 243, 267 (2006) (“The idea that Congress gave 
the Attorney General such broad and unusual authority through an implicit delegation in 
the CSA’s registration provision is not sustainable.”). See also Breyer, 38 Admin L Rev at 
370 (cited in note 125) (“Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and answered, major 
questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the course of the 
statute’s daily administration.”). 
 154 See Chevron, 467 US at 865; John F. Manning, Chevron and the Reasonable Legislator, 
128 Harv L Rev 457, 464 (2014) (explaining that Chevron relies as much on the “reasona-
ble legislator construct” as the Skidmore and Mead doctrines, which explicitly rely on the 
construct). 
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And not just any Congress. Step Zero is an inquiry into how 
a hypothetical reasonable Congress would want to allocate inter-
pretive authority.155 The justices have been remarkably frank that 
Chevron deference rests on a “legal fiction” of congressional in-
tent.156 Chevron itself was agnostic on whether Congress intended 
to grant the agency policymaking discretion when it left a gap in 
the statute, or if the issue slipped Congress’s mind, or if Congress 
deadlocked.157 To the Chevron Court, it did not matter. Because 
Chevron did not hinge on what the enacting Congress actually 
wanted, courts apply Step Zero by making presumptions about 
congressional priorities.158 
 
 155 See Manning, 128 Harv L Rev at 458 (cited in note 154) (“Every framework used 
by the Court for determining the availability of deference has rested on a legal fiction 
about presumed legislative intent.”); SAS Institute, 138 S Ct at 1364 (Breyer dissenting) 
(stating that courts determine how much interpretive authority Congress intended to give 
the agency “by using a canon-like, judicially created construct, the hypothetical reasonable 
legislator, and asking what such legislators would likely have intended had Congress con-
sidered the question”). For a normative defense of the reasonable legislator framework, 
see Merrill and Hickman, 89 Georgetown L J at 872 (cited in note 136). In some recent 
opinion judges have focused, at least rhetorically, on the will of the actual Congress rather 
than that of the hypothetical reasonable Congress. See, for example, City of Arlington, 569 
US at 296, 307 (stating that there is no need to wade into the “murky waters” of congres-
sional intent because Congress legislated against a background rule of agency interpretive 
power). 
 156 Breyer, 38 Admin L Rev at 370 (cited in note 125). See also Scalia, 1989 Duke L J 
at 517 (cited in note 125) (“[A]ny rule adopted in this field represents merely a fictional, 
presumed intent.”). For an empirical defense of the Court’s legal fiction, see Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, Essay, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97 Va L Rev 
2009, 2041 (2011). 
 157 Chevron, 467 US at 865: 
Perhaps that body consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance 
at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with respon-
sibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so; 
perhaps it simply did not consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress 
was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on each 
side decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency. For 
judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred. 
 158 Sometimes, though, a court has more to work with than just a presumption of 
congressional priorities. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2011 codified that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s preemption deter-
minations were to be accorded Skidmore deference rather than the Chevron deference that 
would be accorded under the usual application of Step Zero. 12 USC § 25b(b)(5)(A). The 
legislative history shows that Congress understood the Skidmore-Chevron background 
norm when drafting Dodd-Frank. See Kent H. Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 NYU L 
Rev 1, 34 (2015). When Congress explicitly codifies the standard of review for agency ac-
tions, courts are not free to select an alternative standard of review. It may be inferred 
from the fact that Congress knows how to codify an unwaivable standard of review that 
Congress’s failure to so codify is a permission slip for Chevron waiver. There are two prob-
lems with that inference. First, codifying Chevron or Skidmore is a relatively new (and not 
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With Step Zero’s doctrinal formulations unable to resolve the 
question of whether Chevron is waivable or mandatory, it is nec-
essary to look to the deeper intuitions that inform Step Zero—
namely, the reasons we have Chevron at all. This Part describes 
the hypotheses about Congress that have explicitly and implicitly 
justified Chevron deference and shaped the Step Zero doctrine, 
examining whether Chevron waiver vindicates or undermines the 
values at stake. After an aside on whether Congress would prefer 
a rule- or standard-like Step Zero, it focuses on expertise and ac-
countability, the two traditional justifications made explicit in 
Chevron. However, this Part finds that they give only weak, con-
flicting guidance for Chevron waiver.159 Stronger guidance and 
persuasive normative arguments are found in a hypothesis that 
is largely derived from the scholarly literature: that Chevron is 
justified as a reward for agency thoroughness.160 Because Chevron 
waiver undercuts the goods provided by rigorous ex ante agency pro-
cedures, this Comment urges its prohibition, a procedure-protecting 
rule of law that has echoes in canonical administrative law doctrine. 
A. An Aside on Step Zero Rules and Standards 
The aim of Part III is to recommend a doctrine to govern 
Chevron waiver. Before delving into how the principles underly-
ing Step Zero inform a view of Chevron waiver, it’s worth asking 
whether, all else equal, a reasonable Congress would prefer a 
more rule-like doctrine or a more flexible standard. 
Chevron’s foundations suggest a preference for clearer rules. 
Later interpreters have understood the Chevron decision as con-
cretizing the then-existing deference regime in a more easily  
administrable across-the-board presumption.161 It makes sense for 
 
yet replicated) legislative tool. Previous drafters may not have imagined that they would 
have any use for this tool. Second, the decision to codify a standard of review is a departure 
from the background norm. Unless Congress understands the background norm to license 
Chevron waiver, the failure to depart from the background norm is not an endorsement of 
Chevron waiver. Dodd-Frank, for instance, codified a Skidmore standard in order to depart 
from the Chevron norm, not to avert Skidmore waiver. 
 159 See Parts III.B, III.C. 
 160 See Part III.D. 
 161 Most notably, see Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 516 (cited in note 125). It is true that 
Justice Breyer does not share this view. For Breyer, a step-by-step Chevron framework is 
subordinated to a holistic inquiry into “whether Congress would want a reviewing court to defer 
to the agency interpretation at issue.” Nicholas R. Bednar and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s 
Inevitability, 85 Geo Wash L Rev 1392, 1438 (2017), quoting Hickman, 83 Fordham L Rev 
at 541 (cited in note 81). Breyer does not explicitly address the question of whether the 
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Congress to prefer a clear presumption. That way, when Congress 
sets out to legislate, it can better anticipate how its legislative 
product will be applied and better discharge its constitutional 
duty.162 Of course, the desire for clarity that may have motivated 
Chevron did not carry over to the Mead and Barnhart Courts. 
The clearest lines would be to allow all Chevron waiver or to 
blanketly prohibit it. All other concerns aside, blanketly prohibit-
ing Chevron waiver is more easily administrable. If Chevron 
waiver is permissible, judges (and legislators) will need to con-
front a range of thorny questions about who can waive, how, and 
when.163 
But there are other imaginable lines of relative clarity. Waivers 
by one administration in order to undo the interpretations of the 
last administration are identifiable and an exception could be 
carved out for them, albeit with some difficulty.164 Other more in-
tricate lines are less defensible. It is hard to distinguish between 
waivers instigated by one official or another because the lawyer 
with litigating authority may waive under instructions from the 
president or from various agency officials. Likewise, distinguish-
ing technical rationales from political ones will not be easy be-
cause rationales need not be given when omitting an argument 
from a brief. Moreover, even if a technical rationale were given, it 
could be mere pretext for political motives. 
 
reasonable Congress would prefer a more rule-like or a more standard-like Step Zero be-
cause, for Breyer, the standard-like task of imagining the will of the reasonable Congress 
is the Chevron analysis. 
 162 See Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 517 (cited in note 125) (describing Chevron as creat-
ing a “background rule of law”). See also Sunstein, 92 Va L Rev at 203 (cited in note 3). 
 163 The “who waives” question relates to the question posed in the scholarly commu-
nity about whose interpretations merit Chevron deference. See, for example, David J. Barron 
and Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 S Ct Rev 201, 204 (arguing 
that Chevron deference should extend only to those to whom Congress delegates the power 
to administer the given statute and only when that delegatee “takes personal responsibil-
ity for the decision”); Mead, 533 US at 258 & n 6 (Scalia dissenting) (linking Chevron to 
“authoritative” agency interpretations, which come from “central agency management,” 
including—relevant to Chevron waiver—the general counsel for the agency). The “how” 
question is also difficult: A brief? A letter? Must there be some review by specific agency 
heads? And when? Only before oral argument? 
 164 It is not readily apparent what counts as “post-transition”: Are acting directors 
and officials held over from the previous administration counted as part of the new admin-
istration and therefore permitted to waive or are they not? Should there be some sort of stat-
ute of limitations, prohibiting Chevron waiver some number of days after Inauguration Day? 
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B. Agency Expertise 
The Chevron opinion offered two main hypotheses for why 
Congress left a gap for the agency to fill. The first of these is that 
it wanted the more expert agency to fill in the details of the stat-
utory scheme.165 On this account, statutory ambiguities result be-
cause Congress has reached the limits of its factfinding and tech-
nical sophistication. Congress thereby anoints the agency an 
expert, gap-filling junior legislature. The concern with expertise 
may have informed Mead’s “force of law” test. Whether the agency 
is acting with the force of law is a decent proxy for when Congress 
accepts that the more sophisticated agency is acting as a junior 
legislature. Likewise, the extent to which the agency’s interpre-
tation is a product of its expertise was one of the Step Zero factors 
in Barnhart and was implicit in other factors, such as complexity 
and the interstitial nature of the question.166 
Some Chevron waivers will be motivated by technical exper-
tise, and some will not. But acknowledging that a court cannot 
easily separate out technical waivers from nontechnical waivers 
means that we must consider whether a blanket rule against 
waiver or a rule allowing waiver is more in keeping with the in-
terest in expertise. On the one hand, waiver may be expertise en-
hancing because it allows the agency to more easily achieve its 
most recent view, and it is assumed that technical knowledge is 
cumulative—that we are getting more expert all the time. But on 
balance, the interest in expertise probably cuts against Chevron 
waiver. An interpretation born of notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing or formal adjudication is an interpretation that has engaged 
with technical arguments, whether presented in comments or 
cross-examination.167 A reviewing court cannot be assured that 
that interpretation is the more expert interpretation, but it can 
be assured that it was developed through a process that at least 
attempts to force sober analysis of relevant evidence.168 To allow 
 
 165 Chevron, 467 US at 865. See also Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp v LTV Corp, 496 
US 633, 651–52 (1990) (“[P]ractical agency expertise is one of the principal justifications 
behind Chevron deference.”). Of course, expertise does not explain the full shape of Chevron 
jurisprudence. A Step Zero largely rooted in expertise would limit Chevron to interstitial, 
technical questions rather than more general questions of statutory interpretation on 
which we might think the court is expert. This has not been the case. 
 166 See Barnhart, 535 US at 222. 
 167 For a broader discussion of the connection between Chevron’s domain and agency 
procedure, see Part III.D. 
 168 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and 
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 Fordham L Rev 17, 26 (2001) (“‘Expertise’ is no 
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an agency to waive the deference usually given to that interpre-
tation is to subordinate the fruits of an expertise-channeling pro-
cess to interpretations that could be arrived at in any number of 
possible ways, including nontransparent political bidding. 
C. Accountability 
The Chevron Court also hypothesized that Congress would 
choose to let another “political branch” resolve ambiguities when 
Congress deadlocked.169 Congress would want courts to grant def-
erence to the agency’s interpretation because it would make that 
interpretive process more accountable in two senses. First, Chevron 
enhances electoral accountability. The agency, as part of the ex-
ecutive branch, is responsive to the same group—the electorate—
as Congress and thereby engages in the same kind of interest-
group balancing, approximating how Congress would have inter-
preted the statute. The Chevron opinion considered electoral ac-
countability a feature of its deference regime. The Court admitted 
that whoever interpreted these ambiguous statutes would wind 
up making “policy choices,” and it thought it more reasonable to 
vest that power in the agency, which can “rely upon the incum-
bent administration’s views of wise policy,” than to vest it in 
judges, who are less equipped to “reconcile competing political in-
terests.”170 Second, Chevron enhances accountability to Congress. 
Congress might prefer to allocate interpretive authority to the 
agency because Congress maintains oversight powers and powers 
of the purse that can check the agency in ways it cannot check 
courts.171 Congress might also think it is better positioned to use 
its legislative power to reverse an agency decision than to reverse 
a court ruling.172 A doctrine like Chevron, which steers contested 
 
longer a protective shield to be worn like a sacred vestment. It is a competence to be 
demonstrated by cogent reason-giving.”). 
 169 Chevron, 467 US at 865. 
 170 Id. See also Manning, 96 Colum L Rev at 626 (cited in note 74) (“Chevron makes 
sense of original constitutional commitments to electoral accountability by presuming that 
Congress has selected agencies rather than courts to resolve serious ambiguities in 
agency-administered statutes.”). 
 171 See Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of 
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 Admin L J 269, 282 (1988); Jack M. Beermann, Congressional 
Administration, 43 San Diego L Rev 61, 151–53 (2006). 
 172 See Kmiec, 2 Admin L J at 281–82 (cited in note 171). But see Merrill and Hickman, 
89 Georgetown L J at 865–67 (cited in note 136) (expressing skepticism that Chevron pro-
motes accountability to Congress). 
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policy disputes from courts to agencies, will magnify congres-
sional influence over policy and thereby be appealing to the rea-
sonable legislator.173 
Each sense of accountability finds some grist in Mead. When 
Mead tied deference to the rank of the agency official rendering 
the interpretation, it granted more deference to the agency actors 
most responsive to the democratically elected president.174 And by 
broadly linking deference with agency proceedings that are more 
public in nature, Mead encouraged agencies to put Congress on no-
tice of its actions.175 The most visible agency actors and agency ac-
tions are the most accountable to the electorate and to Congress.176 
As with the expertise factor, accountability gives support for 
each side of the Chevron waiver question. Here a reviewing court 
must separate out the varieties of Chevron waiver. Waiver following 
a presidential transition enhances electoral accountability because 
it enables the newly elected coalition to more easily pursue its 
aims.177 Likewise, post-transition waiver enhances accountability 
 
 173 All this assumes that the reasonable legislator is motivated to maintain his or her 
authority over policy choices. But the reasonable legislator may not be a civic republican. 
Modern legislators often (rationally) prefer to punt the many lose-lose choices legislators 
face. Congress’s determination to avoid politically risky choices and to please all comers 
may in fact be the root of much of the statutory ambiguity Chevron addresses. See Morris 
P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 
39 Pub Choice 33, 46–52 (1982). 
 174 See Mead, 533 US at 233–34. 
 175 See Beermann, 43 San Diego L Rev at 152–53 (cited in note 171) (supporting the 
Chevron framework “when there are likely to be good channels of communication between 
Congress and the agency,” opposing Chevron “when there are not,” and showing how re-
cent Supreme Court decisions cohere with this dichotomy). 
 176 Like expertise, accountability cannot fully explain Chevron’s domain. Article III 
courts are less democratically and congressionally accountable than agencies, judges are 
harder to remove than agency heads, and all deference shifts interpretive authority from 
the courts to the more accountable agency. A solely accountability-based Step Zero would 
therefore maximize deference. Step Zero may not take this shape in part because, as an 
absolute matter, neither courts nor agencies are very accountable. Each was designed to 
be insulated from certain popular pressures, as Chief Justice John Roberts elegantly ar-
gued in his City of Arlington dissent. See City of Arlington, 569 US at 313–14 (Roberts 
dissenting). 
 177 There are a few problems with appealing to a popular mandate to justify waiving 
Chevron. For one, administrative law generally does not grant procedural exceptions to new 
administrations on account of their newness. See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association 
of the United States, Inc v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co, 463 US 29, 57 
(1983). In addition, one wonders whether there will be much of a popular mandate to pur-
sue a given interpretation of a statute, especially if the major-questions limitation on 
Chevron is otherwise in place. See note 153. The question of which policy proposals are 
given a popular mandate is almost always unanswerable, but low-salience ones that did 
not come up in the campaign—like reversing rate caps for inmate calling services—seem 
especially unlikely to have secured popular approval. 
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to Congress because Congress can only oversee the new admin-
istration and not the old one. Outside the presidential transition 
context, Chevron waiver probably undermines accountability.178 
The notice-and-comment process generates opportunities for con-
trol by the political branches. It alerts Congress and the regulated 
parties to the pending action and often requires coordination with 
the president and OIRA.179 There is therefore some assurance that 
the interpretation Chevron waiver undermines—the interpreta-
tion generated by notice and comment—is the product of consul-
tations with elected officials and their closest advisors.180 There is 
no such assurance that the decision to waive Chevron, which can 
be made by a general counsel for an agency with independent lit-
igating authority, is made in coordination with elected officials.181 
Congress’s interest in agencies abiding by procedures that 
alert Congress to pending actions presumes that Congress expects 
to be able to conduct meaningful oversight. But what if Congress 
has a lower estimation of its own powers? Congress may not expect 
it will be able to meaningfully oversee the agencies, given the so-
phistication of the agency’s actions and the collective action prob-
lems inherent in a legislative body.182 In that case, a reasonable 
 
 178 And perhaps also within the post-transition context. Congress set up a procedure 
by which a new administration, along with Congress, may repeal some of the last work of 
the past administration. See Congressional Review Act, Pub L No 104-121, 110 Stat 868 
(1996), codified at 5 USC § 801 et seq. Chevron waiver may supplement the Congressional 
Review Act in ways that run contrary to the limited reversal power authorized by the Act. 
 179 See McNollgast, Political Control of the Bureaucracy, in Peter Newman, ed, The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 50, 54 (Macmillan 1998) (describing 
the APA’s notice-and-comment procedures as performing a “fire alarm” function). 
 180 For a broader discussion of the connection between Chevron’s domain and agency 
procedure, see Part III.D. 
 181 There may be a way to ensure that Chevron can be waived only when done in 
consultation with some elected or high-ranking officials. Litigators who waive Chevron 
could describe the directive to waive, and courts could be more solicitous of waivers di-
rected by a presidential appointee or the president himself. That said, Congress might still 
be wary that this means of changing policy does not ensure consultation with the right 
elected officials. In particular, unlike notice-and-comment rulemaking, neither a directive 
from a high-ranking official nor a description of that directive submitted to the court would 
alert Congress to the change in policy. 
 182 Professors David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran have developed a transaction-
costs model for congressional delegation. As a general matter, Congress delegates issues 
to the agencies when it is unable to overcome its inherent collective action problems. The 
result is that agencies are given authority over the precise issues that Congress is least 
able to act on. Epstein and O’Halloran conclude that we should also have low expectations 
for Congress’s ability to collectively oversee these agencies, given that the agencies handle 
matters over “which congressional policymaking is most prone to failure.” David Epstein 
and Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy 
Making under Separate Powers 74 (Cambridge 1999). But see Brian D. Feinstein, Congress 
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Congress would oppose Chevron waiver—even after a presiden-
tial transition. If Congress cannot meaningfully oversee an 
agency, Congress may prefer procedures that force the agency to 
submit to comments from the interested parties, who will approx-
imate the sort of pressures a less hamstrung Congress could bring 
to bear. 
On net, therefore, a reasonable Congress interested in ac-
countability would oppose Chevron waiver. If there is an excep-
tion, it is for the post-transition waiver, but the case for the post-
transition waiver relies on a few suspect premises: that the people 
gave a mandate to pursue the new interpretation,183 that Congress 
believes it can meaningfully oversee the agencies, and that a post-
transition exception is easily administrable.184 The next factor fur-
ther weakens the case for the post-transition carve out. 
D. Rewarding Rigorous Agency Procedures 
Step Zero links the agency’s chosen procedure and the defer-
ence the agency is accorded, though that relationship may not be 
one-to-one. Asking about agency procedure is frequently the first 
step in the reviewing court’s Step Zero analysis,185 but actions that 
do not follow relatively formal procedures can still be accorded 
Chevron deference.186 Put another way, though the procedure the 
agency used cannot predict the whole of Chevron’s domain, the 
procedure can predict much of it. 
There are static and dynamic reasons why a hypothetical 
Congress might want Chevron deference to be the reward for rig-
orous agency procedures. Statically, the Congress might think 
that agency output is superior on an array of criteria when the 
agency follows more formal procedures.187 Dynamically, Congress 
 
in the Administrative State, 95 Wash U L Rev 1187, 1232–37 (2018) (demonstrating that 
oversight hearings are powerful tools for checking administrative agencies). 
 183 See note 205. 
 184 For some concerns about the administrability of a presidential-transition excep-
tion, see note 164. 
 185 See Hickman, 83 Fordham L Rev at 550 (cited in note 81) (“[M]any circuit courts 
in practice seem quite simply to extend Chevron review to the notice-and-comment regu-
lations and formal adjudications mentioned in Christensen and Mead.”). Step Zero may be 
even more closely tied to agency procedure post–City of Arlington. See text accompanying 
note 147. 
 186 See, for example, Mylan Laboratories, Inc v Thompson, 389 F3d 1272, 1279–80 
(DC Cir 2004); Fournier v Sebelius, 718 F3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir 2013). 
 187 See text accompanying notes 167–68 and 179. 
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might want to incent agencies to take on these procedures, in ef-
fect awarding an agency’s ex ante scrupulousness with ex post 
deference.188 
An emphasis on ex ante procedures can be justified through 
fuller conceptions of the Chevron rationales discussed above.189 
For one, the procedures may enhance expertise. A reviewing court 
may be more confident that the agency acted according to its ex-
pertise because it went through the discipline of responding to the 
comments of interested parties or the arguments presented in the 
adversarial adjudicatory process. An appeal to the expert reputa-
tion of the agency is not as persuasive as an appeal to the demon-
strated thoughtfulness of the agency. Likewise, a fuller picture of 
accountability can justify an emphasis on ex ante procedures. If 
accountability is about responsiveness to stakeholder voices, not 
just those expressed through elections, then administrative pro-
cedures can be accountability enhancing. Professor Jud Mathews 
has argued that giving those impacted by a decision input in the 
decision-making is a means of ensuring “non-domination,” a foun-
dational democratic principle.190 
Congress might also favor more formal agency procedures be-
cause agencies who engage in these procedures act more “legisla-
tively.” Notice-and-comment rulemaking and adjudication simu-
late multiple functions of federal lawmaking. For instance, notice 
of the potential for regulation is given to impacted parties well 
before the regulation is finalized, a procedure akin to the legisla-
tive requirement that bills be introduced in committee.191 Moreo-
 
 188 Sunstein, 92 Va L Rev at 225–26 (2006) (cited in note 3) (describing the results of 
Mead as giving the “pay me now or pay me later” choice—that is, choose the constraints of 
procedure or those of more searching judicial review). See also Perez v Mortgage Bankers 
Association, 135 S Ct 1199, 1211–12 (2015) (Scalia concurring) (noting that the APA ex-
cluded certain actions from notice-and-comment rulemaking under the assumption that 
they would be subject to de novo judicial review). But see generally Mark Seidenfeld, Play-
ing Games with the Timing of Judicial Review: An Evaluation of Proposals to Restrict Pre-
enforcement Review of Agency Rules, 58 Ohio St L J 85 (1997) (defining some circum-
stances under which postenforcement review is superior to ex ante notice-and-comment 
review). 
 189 See notes 167–68 and 178–81 and accompanying text. 
 190 See Jud Mathews, Minimally Democratic Administrative Law, 68 Admin L Rev 
605, 637–40 (2016). The consequence of Mathews’s emphasis on “non-domination” is that 
the intensity of the review should vary with the adequacy of the agency procedure. Defer-
ence is accorded when the agency “adequately took into account the interests of those af-
fected by its decision,” but more scrutiny is applied when the agency did not. Id at 645–46. 
 191 See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 
105 Harv L Rev 1511, 1559–60 (1992). 
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ver, the regulation itself is shaped slowly, giving space for legis-
lative ideals of deliberation and careful consideration.192 In this 
vein, Mead hailed notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal 
adjudication for fostering “fairness and deliberation.”193 
If deference is the reward for agency procedural rigor, courts 
should be especially suspicious of Chevron waiver. A midlitigation 
policy reversal does not require that the agency genuinely re-
spond to the technical concerns of affected parties as it did when 
it initially formulated the interpretation. Likewise, the failure to 
include those parties in the midlitigation reversal subverts the 
way notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication 
give affected parties the chance to be heard, ensure that they will 
consent to the outcome because they respect the integrity of the 
process, and encourage the agency to act in ways that resemble 
congressional deliberation. Chevron waiver breaks the desirable 
link between procedure and deference, allowing the agency to by-
pass the hurdles Congress set in the path of a rule’s rescission. 
The concern is the same whether the agency seeks to change pol-
icy after an election or not. Chevron waiver thus runs contrary to 
one of the significant intuitions underlying Chevron, an intuition 
that has helped shape much of the Step Zero doctrine. 
When we step back from the doctrinal tests, which were con-
structed by courts not anticipating the possibility of Chevron 
 
 192 See id at 1541–62. A preference for slow and deliberate lawmaking is deeply rooted 
in American constitutional theory. See Joseph M. Bessette, Deliberative Democracy: The 
Majority Principle in Republican Government, in Robert A. Goldwin and William A. 
Schambra, eds, How Democratic Is the Constitution? 102, 105–11 (AEI 1980). Slow and 
deliberate lawmaking may enable expertise by facilitating a genuine contest of ideas and 
setting a stumbling block before knee-jerk proposals, but it has other virtues too. In par-
ticular, slow, deliberative government yields consent, legitimacy, stability, and social 
peace. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 15–18 (Yale 1975). 
 193 Mead, 533 US at 230. But a reasonable Congress might not be so sanguine about 
these procedures, which may give little guarantee of efficient results, solicitous regulators, 
or genuine deliberation. See E. Donald Elliott, Re-inventing Rulemaking, 41 Duke L J 
1490, 1492–93 (1992): 
No administrator in Washington turns to full-scale notice-and-comment rule-
making when she is genuinely interested in obtaining input from interested parties. 
Notice-and-comment rulemaking is to public participation as Japanese Kabuki 
theater is to human passions—a highly stylized process for displaying in a for-
mal way the essence of something which in real life takes place in other venues. 
See also Aaron L. Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 Ohio St L J 237, 269 
(2014) (chronicling some of the defects in notice-and-comment rulemaking that reduce le-
gitimacy and efficiency). Even if these procedures do not fully guarantee a given set of 
ends, they offer more guarantees than a procedure-free alternative like Chevron waiver. 
Elliott and Nielson argued for more rigorous procedures, not less. 
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waiver, and look to the principles that led to those tests, it be-
comes apparent that Chevron waiver should not be permitted. 
Step Zero is informed and shaped by a series of principles: exper-
tise, accountability, and procedural values. Neither expertise nor 
accountability gives firm guidance as to whether Chevron defer-
ence is mandatory or optional, but the interest in rigorous agency 
procedures does. If one weighs these principles evenly, the inter-
est in rigorous procedures—by virtue of being the only principle 
that strongly comes down either for or against Chevron waiver—
should control the issue.194 But the case can be made even more 
strongly. 
Not only is the interest in rigorous procedures the tiebreak-
ing factor; it should be thought of as the foremost factor. For one, 
the procedural rationale for Chevron secures the other rationales. 
It is through ex ante procedures like notice and comment that ob-
servers can be more sure agencies are bringing their expertise to 
bear, are coordinating with the political branches, and are alert-
ing individuals who have something at stake in the pending ac-
tion. Congress’s interest in these procedures subsumes many of 
the other reasons for Chevron. It also provides justifications of its 
own. In particular, these procedures vindicate an idea of demo-
cratic legitimacy that is more comprehensive than electoral ac-
countability or congressional oversight.195 
The assertion that Chevron deference is so deeply tied up 
with rigorous agency procedures that, once an interpretation has 
gone through those procedures, deference should be mandatory 
may strike the careful reader as an odd assertion. After all, Mead 
came on the heels of Christensen v Harris County,196 which sug-
gested a rule tying deference to procedure and another rule tying 
deference to “force of law.”197 Mead explicitly chose “force of 
law.”198 The contention in this Comment is not that an agency-
procedure test is a perfect substitute for the many Step Zero tests 
but rather that the reasonable Congress’s interest in agency pro-
cedures explains a good deal of the shape of those Step Zero tests 
 
 194 Note that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, though a choice to not present a Chevron 
argument, does not face these normative problems. Whereas Chevron waiver is always a 
departure from the reasoning at promulgation, litigating positions that trigger Step-One-
and-a-Half generally follow from the reasoning at promulgation. See note 94; Hemel and 
Nielson, 84 U Chi L Rev at 765–71, 779–81 (cited in note 94). 
 195 See text accompanying notes 189–94. 
 196 529 US 576 (2000). 
 197 See note 131. 
 198 See notes 134–36 and accompanying text. 
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and, more to the point, helps explain the question those tests don’t 
address: whether deference is mandatory. 
It would not be unprecedented to require deference in certain 
circumstances, whether the agency seeks it or not. Administra-
tive law is willing to constrain an agency’s choice of litigating po-
sitions for the sake of the constitutional structure. Most notably, 
the rule of Securities and Exchange Commission v Chenery Corp199 
forbids a court from reviewing an agency’s post hoc rationaliza-
tions.200 Put another way, judicial review is limited to the grounds 
articulated when the action was taken. Chenery I has a Chevron 
corollary, Bowen v Georgetown University Hospital,201 which clar-
ified that Chevron deference is given only to statutory interpreta-
tions articulated when the agency took the action, not to subse-
quent “convenient litigating position[s].”202 There are many 
principled explanations for Chenery I, but Professor Kevin Stack 
has persuasively rooted Chenery I in functional constitutional 
concerns.203 He contends that Chenery I ensures many of the aims 
of the reasonable Congress. By forcing the agency to give its rea-
sons upfront lest they be disregarded by a reviewing court, 
Chenery I ensures that the agency has exercised its expertise and 
that politically accountable officials have accepted the agency’s 
rationale.204 
Applying Chenery I to the question of Chevron waiver poses 
the question of just what Chenery I held. If it merely forbade the 
review of post hoc rationalizations, Chenery I does not help us 
think through Chevron waiver. Chevron waiver is a post hoc re-
moval of the initial reasoning, not a new rationalization. But un-
der Stack’s justification of Chenery I, the rule is not simply about 
post hoc rationalizations. Rather, one could restate Chenery I as 
the proposition that a court must limit its review to the reasons 
the agency offered when the action was taken.205 If we apply this 
 
 199 318 US 80 (1943) (“Chenery I”). 
 200 Id at 94. See also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc v Volpe, 401 US 402, 419 
(1971) (“‘[P]ost hoc’ rationalizations . . . have traditionally been found to be an inadequate 
basis for review.”); State Farm, 463 US at 50 (“[A]n agency’s action must be upheld, if at 
all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself.”). 
 201 488 US 204 (1988). 
 202 Id at 213. 
 203 See generally Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 
Yale L J 952 (2007). 
 204 See id at 993–98. 
 205 It is not surprising that courts have focused on “post hoc rationalizations.” Agen-
cies more often find creative new ways to defend their policy, not creative new ways to 
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broader construction of Chenery I to the question of Chevron 
waiver, then Chevron waiver is prohibited. A reviewing court 
would limit itself to the agency’s original reasoning—including its 
expected deference—and not yield to clever, post hoc litigating po-
sitions. The prohibition on Chevron waiver could thus be justified 
as an application of the long-standing Chenery I rule, or, at the 
very least, is rooted in the same concern that agencies not evade 
the requirement to rigorously give their reasons before acting.206 
CONCLUSION 
In an age of high-stakes, high-pressure administration,  
Chevron deference is front and center. Rooted in a recognition 
that Congress generally prefers that the agency, rather than the 
court, have the authority to interpret ambiguities and fill gaps in 
a statute, Chevron has only raised the stakes of agency action. 
The Global Tel*Link case floated a new possibility for Chevron 
deference: whether the court can apply the Chevron framework 
when an agency does not seek it. If Chevron waiver is permissible, 
there are many circumstances in which an agency will seek to use 
this new tool: before or after presidential transitions, under pres-
sure from the president or on its own accord, for technical or polit-
ical reasons. In all cases, an agency will waive Chevron because 
it wants to speedily reverse a position arrived at through some 
legally binding process. 
 
undermine it, so courts may have trouble imagining evasions of the agency’s initial ra-
tionale that are not post hoc rationalizations. 
 206 Late in this Comment’s publication process, the DC Circuit issued an opinion that 
affirmed the reasoning presented here. In a copyright opinion written by Judge Sri Srinivasan 
and joined by Judges Judith W. Rogers and Thomas B. Griffith, the court held that an 
agency’s failure to invoke Chevron in its briefing does not forfeit the right to Chevron def-
erence. SoundExchange, Inc v Copyright Royalty Board, 2018 WL 4440299, *8–9 (DC Cir). 
Chevron analysis instead depends on whether the “agency manifests its engagement in 
the kind of interpretive exercise to which review under Chevron generally applies—that 
is, interpreting a statute it is charged with administering in a manner (and through a 
process) evincing an exercise of its lawmaking authority.” Id at 9. Not only can Chevron 
analysis be applied when the agency fails to raise Chevron at litigation, the agency is not 
even required to cite to Chevron during its decision-making. Id. What matters is the pro-
cess the agency used. 
 The court’s rule seems to have been shaped by a fear that too much would depend upon 
the quality of the agency’s lawyers. A rule requiring agency lawyers to brief Chevron ar-
guments would tend toward a cumbersome “magic words” requirement. Id. And “[a]fter 
all, ‘it is the expertise of the agency, not its lawyers,’ that ultimately matters.” Id. But why 
should a court be more concerned about the potential for poor agency lawyering to alter 
regulatory outcomes in the Chevron context than in any other? This Comment offers one 
rationale: that Chevron, like Chenery I, is a judicial rule meant to privilege and incent a 
rigorous and complete agency decision-making process. 
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As a possible new threshold inquiry before the Chevron 
framework is applied, Chevron waiver would inhere at Step Zero. 
Step Zero is an imprecise body of doctrine, and its doctrinal for-
mulations neither prescribe, imply, nor prohibit the possibility of 
Chevron waiver. The doctrinal confusion results from the Court’s 
underlying aim. Namely, the Court seeks to apply deference in a 
way that vindicates Chevron’s purposes, particularly those pur-
poses the Court can ascribe to a hypothetical reasonable Congress 
that had a reason for leaving ambiguity in the statute for the 
agency to resolve. 
The reasons for Chevron deference caution against allowing 
Chevron waiver. If Chevron waiver is tolerated, agencies can more 
easily undo policies arrived at through relatively formal proce-
dures. But we have Chevron deference in large part because 
courts assume a reasonable Congress wants more expert, ac-
countable agencies to fill in statutory ambiguities while following 
certain procedures. These procedures—which Chevron waiver 
would directly undermine—help ensure that the agency actually 
wrestles with technical arguments, more fully deliberates, alerts 
Congress and individuals to a pending action, works with elected 
officials, and provides a basic opportunity for individual partici-
pation in the decision-making. Chevron waiver erodes the practi-
cal reasons for having Chevron deference at all. 
